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Glossary of terms 
 
 
AMIS   African Union Mission in Sudan (2004 – 2007) 
AMISOM  African Union Mission to Somalia (2007 – present) 
AU   African Union (2001 – present)   
CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan, 2005) 
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
DPA   Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) 
FSI   Fragile/Failed States Index 
GoS   Government of Sudan 
GoSS   Government of South Sudan 
HDI   UNDP Human Development Index 
IDPs   Internally Displaced Persons 
IGADD   Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (1986-1996) 
JEM   Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur) 
NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations 
NCP   National Congress Party (Sudan) 
NSSP   National Security and Stabilisation Plan 
OAU   Organization of African Unity (1963 – 2001) 
ODA   Official Development Assistance 
OECD/   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ 
DAC   Development Assistance Committee 
SAF   Sudanese Armed Forces 
SLM/SLA  Sudan Liberation Movement/Army   
SPLM/A  Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
SPF   Somali Police Force    
SSANSA  South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms 
SSDF   Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
SSPS   Southern Sudan Police Service  
SSR   Security Sector/System Reform 
TFG   Transitional Federal Government (Somalia; 2004) 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMID  African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur    
   (2007 – present) 
UNITAF  Unified Task Force 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNMIS   United Nations Mission in the Sudan (2005 – 2011) 
UNOSOM-I  United Nations Operation in Somalia 
UNOSOM II  United Nations Operation in Somalia II (1993 – 1995)  
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Introduction 
 
“Some of our missions are extending initial security and stability gains into longer-term peacebuilding.  
More and more frequently peacekeeping operations are expected to initiate early peacebuilding activities  
in the immediate aftermath of conflict and carefully designed transitions to ensure that sufficient resources  
and expertise are maintained to consolidate the peacebuilding efforts.”1    
       
 
Throughout the Cold War, the possibilities of UN peacekeeping were limited by a stifling 
East-West deadlock in the Security Council. Thereafter, in the early 1990s, the widespread 
optimism about the supposedly new peacebuilding capabilities vanished with humanitarian 
crises in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994). The subsequent terrorist attacks of 9/11 then 
inaugurated a renewal within the international security agenda. Post-conflict states were 
increasingly branded as ‘fragile’ and treated as potential threats to international law and order, 
to justify international military involvement.  
Simultaneously, there emerged a growing consensus that in order to create a fertile soil for 
socio-economic development in these states, the international community first had to reform 
or develop their security and justice sectors. The OECD’s handbook on security sector reform, 
for instance, constitutes a very recent example of “the assumed interconnections between 
security and development as a taken-for-granted point of departure.”2 Policymakers, 
moreover, tend to present the ‘security-development nexus’ as a causal relationship. This 
fuelled the notion that security serves as the key prerequisite for socio-economic development 
after civil conflicts. In turn, this has fed an international consensus that the probability by 
which fragile states relapse into conflict is inversely proportional to the level of progress 
made in security sector reform during periods of relative peace. This corresponds to the 
precept that “the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war”3, which is now typically 
invoked to justify international attempts at post-conflict state reconstruction. 
                                                          
1
 Statement by Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UN General Assembly 
Thematic Debate: ‘UN Peacekeeping – Looking into the Future’ (22-06-10) pp. 1-5, there: p. 3. ; For full speech 
see: http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/thematic/peace/usg.pdf.  
2
 M. Stern & J. Öjendal, ‘Exploring the Security-Development Nexus’, in: Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain and 
Joakim Öjendal (ed.), The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development (Anthem Press, 2013) 
pp. 13-40, there: p. 15. 
3
 Author’s note: The saying “The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed a war” is supposedly an old 
Chinese proverb. It has however increasingly been attributed to U.S. General George S. Patton Jr. (1885-1945). 
More recently, the predicate was also used to outline e.g. the Dutch approach to fragile states in a foreign policy 
document titled Veiligheid en Ontwikkeling in Fragiele Staten, © Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). 
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In an attempt to question the former line of thinking, this inquiry tries to answer the following 
research question: to what extent has post-Cold War Security Sector/System Reform (SSR) 
contributed to post-conflict state building in Somalia and Sudan? This means unravelling the 
problems with applying the former precept to Somalia and Sudan. In particular, this inquiry 
will critically appraise its theoretical premise – the notion that ‘institutionalization before 
liberalization’ is the most suitable method to realise peace and security in post-conflict 
environments.  
As a theoretical framework, this inquiry adopts Paul D. Miller’s concept of ‘armed 
international liberal state building’ (hereafter: ‘armed state building’). This is the “attempt by 
liberal states to use military, political and economic power to compel weak, failed, or 
collapsed states to govern more effectively and accountably, as understood by Westphalian 
and liberal norms.”4 Miller furthermore distinguishes between different types and degrees of 
state failure and hypothesizes that “armed state building is more likely to succeed if state 
builders adopt a strategy that corresponds to the type and degree of state failure; more 
invasive efforts for aspects of statehood that show a greater degree of failure and less invasive 
in areas that show less failure.”5 The following case studies will help to indicate the problems 
with this hypothesis.  
In adopting Miller’s concept, this inquiry will look exclusively at military efforts to rebuild 
the security and legitimacy domains of the state. This means that “political and economic 
power” shall be left beyond the scope of attention. While this has the advantage of a 
straightforward focus on state institutions and the efforts of military interventions, ‘state 
building’ as a field of study however remains hard to isolate because of its close relationship 
to widely different international actions.
6
 Inevitably, the limited scope of this inquiry shall 
therefore place the subject-matter in an artificial analytical vacuum. 
 
First, chapter one will start by providing a theoretical reflection on armed state building. The 
second section will then place it in the historical context of ‘liberal peacebuilding’7 and 
discusses the definition of a ‘post-conflict’ zone. The third section will then examine the 
nature of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and reflects on the ‘crises of citizenship and 
                                                          
4 P.D. Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012 (Cornell University Press, 2013) p. 7. 
5 Ibid., p. 80. 
6 Ibid., p. 7. 
7 Here defined as the “promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions 
associated with “modern” states as a driving force for building “peace”’. See: E. Newman, R. Paris & O.P. 
Richmond, ‘Introduction’, in: E. Newman, R. Paris & O.P. Richmond (ed.) New Perspectives on Liberal 
Peacebuilding (United Nations University Press, 2009) pp. 3-25, there: p. 3. 
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legitimacy in the state’ as chameleonic key phenomena to understand their root causes. 
Chapter two reflects on the concept of SSR in relation to armed state building and its potential 
contributions to security and legitimacy. This inquiry measures contributions to the security 
domain by looking at both the qualitative and quantitative progress made in the 
restoration/establishment of the ‘monopoly on the use of force’ of the state. This will 
conveniently be defined as the state’s control over the core security actors and their 
management and oversight bodies, combined with the effectiveness of justice and law 
enforcement institutions. As a part of its analysis, this inquiry will also address the progress 
made within Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in cases 
where these have been implemented. 
Furthermore, the contributions to state legitimacy – here perceived as input or process 
legitimacy
8
 – are measured by assessing the process of establishing state institutions together 
with the empowerment of civil society representatives, which could potentially broaden the 
overall participation in the peace agreement. In addition, the inquiry will look at the progress 
made in community confidence-building measures to build legitimacy. This will be 
supplemented by qualitative discourse analyses, based on primary sources from local media 
and NGO reports.  
 
Next, chapters three and four will scrutinize the activities of the international peacebuilding 
missions called UNOSOM-II (1993 - 1995), AMIS (2004 – 2007) and UNMIS (2005 – 2011). 
After unpacking the post-Cold War problems of Somalia and Sudan, we will start by 
determining the missions’ relationship to SSR. Next, we will reflect on the progress made 
within relevant activities throughout the missions’ deployment. This involves e.g. analysing 
reports by the Secretary-General and field reports by NGOs.  
This inquiry shall then attempt to provide a measure of the missions’ contributions to the 
security and legitimacy domains of the state. Thereafter, these chapters will also offer some 
preliminary thoughts on the early deployment phases of AMISOM (2007 – present)  and 
UNAMID (2007 – present). While it is too early in time to draw up conclusions about these 
missions, they could nonetheless assist us in further elaboration on the efforts of preceding 
missions. Finally, chapter five will attempt to answer the main research question by analysing 
the international military efforts vis-à-vis the encountered problems in Somalia and Sudan. 
                                                          
8 “When the legitimacy of the state is tied to agreed rules of procedure through which the state takes binding 
decisions and organizes people’s participation.” ; See, e.g.: The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: 
Unpacking Complexity (© OECD, 2010) p. 23. 
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This inquiry is prone to a number of methodological problems. First, the subject-matter 
concerns very recent developments, which diminishes the historical detachment and blurs the 
distinction between primary and secondary source material. This might make it difficult to 
produce a reflective and contentious treatment of the norms and values that are integral to 
building liberal states in illiberal contexts. The analysis, however, thankfully builds on the 
work of authors e.g. Jackson and Egnell & Haldén who have already succeeded in critically 
reviewing the relationship between SSR and state building. Similarly, Roland Paris and Oliver 
P. Richmond have already questioned recent international military interventions with the 
purpose of building a ‘liberal’ peace. 
Second, the study of SSR continues to lack an established method to holistically assess the 
contribution of various activities to state building. Undoubtedly, this is related to the ongoing 
absence of an integrated approach to SSR in the UN system.
9
 In this sense, the measurements 
in this inquiry may therefore also be disputable. Notwithstanding, they have been cemented in 
the historical context of state building in Somalia and Sudan. At the very least, they could 
therefore help to elucidate the a variety of problems that policy makers should consider.  
 
Third, it is valuable to briefly explain the selection of case studies. Somalia and Sudan both 
fall within the bottom 20% of the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Unsurprisingly, these 
countries have also experienced devastating civil wars and violent conflicts between ethnic-, 
region- and clan-based groups. In addition, the vast majority of international involvement in 
the Horn of Africa over the past twenty years has been directed at Somalia and Sudan. This 
means that both of them have been subject to changing trends in post-1989 peacekeeping, but 
consistently remained ranked in the top-5 of the FSI. Taken together, Somalia and Sudan also 
cover a wide theoretical span of intra-state conflicts, since group identities and political 
loyalties here have been formed along ethnic, tribal, clan-based or geographic lines. In this 
way, the cases of Somalia and Sudan both provide ample space for a historical analysis of the 
central research question. 
Moreover, the ethnic- and region-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa are essentially 
reflections of the challenges of state and nation-building.
10
 A study of past international 
military efforts in this region could therefore potentially help us to better deal with these 
                                                          
9 H. Hänggi & V. Scherrer, ‘Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations’, 
International Peacekeeping Vol. 15 No. 4 (2008) pp. 491-494. 
10 K. Mengisteab, ‘Poverty, Inequality, State Identity and Chronic Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa’, in: 
Redie Bereketeab (ed.), The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security (Pluto Press, 
2013) pp. 26-39, there: pp. 26-28. 
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challenges in the future. In particular, measuring past military efforts could articulate key 
security and legitimacy issues that may entail some lessons learned for upcoming 
international military interventions. Studies of this kind will testify to the indispensable value 
of scholarly practice to the military profession. This particular study, however, should only go 
in pair with a responsible amount of academic modesty.  
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1. Toward State Building in the Horn of Africa 
 
“Processes of peacebuilding and state building are designed to develop a  
liberal social contract in contrast to the predatory state that mainstream  
state formation expects.”11 
 
 
1.1. Armed State Building: A Reflective Definition 
 
Based on a century of US/UN-led efforts (1898-2012), Miller defines ‘armed state building’ 
as an exercise of military power by ‘great powers.’12 This has the purpose to compel failed or 
collapsed states to govern more effectively. Armed state building is marked by the presence of 
international military forces, which influences the dynamic between international and local 
actors. This process typically occurs in concentrated ‘pockets’ of time and consists of 
technical exercises in institutional capacity development. It is also a process in which one 
state (or a collection of states) exercises political, military and economic power over another. 
The presence of international military forces is crucial because it alters local balances of 
power and partially overrides or supplants a weak state’s sovereignty.  
This is justified by the need to compel weak states to abide by the international norms of 
statehood. These norms reflect the Westphalian system of individual, coexisting and coequal 
sovereign units. On the other hand, they represent the liberalism that has defined armed state 
building since the end of the Cold War.
13
 Historical analyses of state building inevitably 
involve tackling some fundamental questions about the meaning, activities and nature of the 
state. This section will therefore start by reflecting on the historical state formation process in 
Western Europe vis-à-vis post-colonial Africa. It will then suggest an ideal-typology of 
different kinds and degrees of state failure with matching strategies of state building.  
 
Prominent western scholars have indicated the inextricable links between coercion, legitimacy 
and the Westphalian state. In his Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes perceived the state as a 
sovereign power to which men granted authority to use coercion “[…] so it can bring an end 
to the brutal state of nature” of human life as an endless war. In his Politics as a Vocation, 
                                                          
11 O.P. Richmond, ‘The Legacy of State Formation Theory for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’, International 
Peacekeeping Vol. 20 No. 3 (2013) p. 308. 
12 Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012, p. 7. 
13 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
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Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”14 In Weberian terms, the 
process of claiming legitimacy while exercising political, legal and military authority 
necessarily involves appealing to a normative framework of right and wrong ways by which 
to exercise that authority. In this way, the state lays claim to legitimacy by invoking its own 
theory of justice to validate its actions, coercion and existence. To this end, the state begins to 
embody and spread public norms about justice and legitimacy. Norms legitimize power, and 
theories of justice thus grant legitimate power to the state.
15
    
  
Furthermore, the late Charles Tilly, a prominent historian of state formation, distinguished 
four essential activities that defined the European state. (1) ‘State making’ – the attacking and 
checking of competitors and challengers within the territory claimed by the state; (2) ‘War 
making’ – the attacking of rivals outside the territory already claimed by the state; (3) 
‘Protection’ – the attacking and checking of rivals of the rulers’ principal allies, whether 
inside or outside the state’s claimed territory and (4) ‘Extraction’ – the drawing of resources 
from the subject population to pursue the former activities. The latter required state authorities 
to bargain with other power holders and groups of ordinary people over the conditions under 
which the state could extract or control.
16
  
Tilly also suggested that the relative balance among these four activities affected the emerging 
states: “To the extent that war making went on with relatively little extraction, protection, and 
state making […] military forces ended up playing a larger and more autonomous part in 
national politics.”17 However, the modern European state ultimately arose from a historical 
process that involved monopolizing the use of force and bargaining with power-holding elites 
to gain legitimacy. In this way, legitimate rule became tied to accountability to ‘checks and 
balances’ and subordination to the rule of law, which is reflected in the aforementioned 
process legitimacy. 
 
States that historically demonstrated the former four activities are characterized by intensive 
rural-urban trade that provided rulers with an opportunity to collect revenues through customs 
                                                          
14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill 
(1651) p. 76. ; Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919). 
15 Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, pp. 40, 42. 
16 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1990 (Cambridge, Massachusetts etc.: Blackwell 
1990) pp. 96, 99. 
17 C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & 
Theda Skocpol (ed.) Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 169-191, there: pp. 183-
184. 
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and excise taxes. Cities served as containers and distribution points for the capital by which 
urban ruling classes extended their influence through the urban hinterland.
18
  
Ndulo, director of the Cornell University’s Institute for African Development, contrastingly 
argues that colonialism divided Africa into two societies. The great majority of people lived in 
rural areas, which made it fall largely outside the framework of colonial elitism. Meanwhile, 
the urban economy and culture formed the link between the metropolitan country and colony. 
Ndulo therewith suggests that this colonial rural/urban divide has continued and grown until 
present-day. This process has left the rural areas neglected, marginalized and impoverished. 
As a consequence, the state here has become “extremely weak” and “almost completely 
irrelevant as a provider of services.”19 Jeffrey Herbst advances Ndulo’s argument by 
remarking how contrary to Europe, the current states in Africa were created well before many 
of the capital cities had reached maturity. While the European colonizers created many urban 
areas, these cities subsequently failed to instigate the same processes of state creation as in 
Europe. Colonizers, according to Herbst, were not interested in duplicating the same power 
infrastructure that bound cities to hinterland in their homelands. Rather, they mainly used the 
capital cities of Africa for their own colonial economic needs and purposes.
20
  
 
This helped to create a particular urban/city vs. rural/hinterland dualism in African states, 
which in turn determined how national politics and legitimacy took shape after independence. 
While urban-based leaders of Africa still struggle to establish physical control over substantial 
parts of the population, their physical control over the capital city did however become the 
easiest discernible form of political authority. For example, it can hardly be called a 
coincidence that the attendees of the post-independence Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
summits were all in control over their capital cities.
21
 Furthermore, in the early 1990s, it was 
argued that the post-colonial history of Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by an unresolved 
political struggle that reflects exactly this particular divide: “On the one hand, political elites 
wish to extend the authority of the state  over scattered populations, most of whom live in 
rural areas; on the other hand, peasants remain determined to preserve a realm of authority 
                                                          
18 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, pp. 49, 51. 
19 M. Ndulo, ‘The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institution Building’, National Black Law 
Journal Vol. 16  
No. 1 (1998) pp. 76-77. 
20 J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton University 
Press 2000) pp. 15-16. 
21 Ibid., pp. 18, 111. 
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within which to make decisions about their own lives.”22 African rulers, moreover, often 
incorporated ethnic groups into their patronage networks through ethnic intermediaries. 
‘Ethnicity’, in this way, became a predominantly political phenomenon in which political 
leaders were able to define its content and set the stage for ethnic competition. Crucially, most 
of these rulers were often unable to meet the needs of their growing urban populations, which 
frequently resulted in ethnic or religious-based coups, revolutions and intergroup conflict.
23
 
State formation in Sub-Saharan Africa has thus been a severely fragmented process which has 
severely limited the state’s power over elites. Inevitably, this fragmentation has also affected 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force, its claim to legitimacy and its capacity to rule. 
 
Armed state building, the effort to compel failed states to govern more effectively, is based on 
the premise that states can experience failure. A range of scholars have explored the 
characteristics of a ‘failed state’, emphasized different criteria and developed various albeit 
inconclusive typologies.
24
 Kraxberger – who authored the book Failed States: Realities, Risks 
and Responses – remarks how the European-inspired, Westphalian framework for the modern 
territorial state has gradually been established as the global norm. ‘Stateness’, in this sense, 
refers to the degree in which states fulfil common expectations held by the international 
community e.g. providing a level of physical security for citizens and promote economic and 
human development. States thus ‘fail’ when they experience a decline in legitimate and 
effective governance along Westphalian lines.
25
  
Miller identifies ‘institution-building’ and the role of power and norms as chief elements of 
armed state building. This is consistent with Acemoglu & Robinson’s recent emphasis on 
political and institutional factors in their treatise on the origins of failed nations.
26
 Similarly, 
Paris advocates the ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ approach to fragile states. He 
argues that “what is needed in the immediate postconflict period is not democratic ferment 
and economic upheaval, but political stability and the establishment of effective 
administration over the territory. Only when a working governmental authority has been 
                                                          
22 M. Bratton, ‘Peasant-State Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and Disengagement’, in: 
Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli & Vivienne Shue (ed.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and 
Transformation in the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 231. 
23 C.G. Thies, ‘The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa’, The Journal of Politics Vol. 69 
No. 3 (2007) p. 719. 
24 For a theoretical discussion see: Miller, pp. 53-58. 
25 B.M. Kraxberger, ‘Rethinking Responses to State Failure, With Special Reference to Africa’, Progress in 
Development Studies Vol. 12 Nos. 2-3 (2012) pp. 99-100. 
26 See: D. Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty 
(London 2013). 
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reestablished should peacebuilders initiate a series of gradual democratic and market-oriented 
reforms.”27 State builders, however, cannot simply build a working governmental authority 
without regard for the fundamental problems that underpin specific post-conflict 
environments. Egnell & Haldén have for instance criticized the “lack of contextual 
understanding” which has created an “ad hoc and piecemeal approach to SSR based on 
normative assumptions rather than theoretically and historically informed strategies for the 
specific operational context.”28 
 
Nonetheless, armed state building is underpinned by the norms, values and institutional 
infrastructure of liberal democracies. This corresponds to Newman, Paris & Richmond’s 
observation that contemporary peacebuilding is often described as ‘liberal peacebuilding’, 
given the emphasis on institution-building based on democracy. This focus, in turn, is vested 
on the idea of a ‘liberal peace’ – the idea that particular kinds of (liberally constituted) 
societies will tend to be more peaceful in their domestic affairs and international relations.
29
 
In this way, the justification of international military state building efforts thus stems from 
predominantly Western norms about the primacy of the Westphalian ‘liberal-democratic state’ 
over other (more autocratic) models.  
However, the primacy of the ‘(neo)liberal approach’ to state building has been subject to a 
variety of criticisms. Newman, Paris & Richmond point out that the liberal peace and its neo-
liberal economic dimensions are not necessarily appropriate for conflicted or divided 
societies.
30
 Paris himself argued that the process of political and economic liberalization has 
generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states, which only hindered the 
consolidation of peace and sometimes even sparked renewed fighting.
31
 In order to prevent or 
mitigate these effects, liberalization must be preceded by institutionalization.
32
 Podder, 
however, argued that the adoption of a liberal agenda of technocracy, institutionalisation and 
procedural democracy can encourage a somewhat incomplete and, at times, opaque 
understanding of the interactions and exchanges between actors, norms and practices. This 
becomes especially dangerous when these processes are accelerated under conditions of 
                                                          
27 R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
pp. 187-188. 
28 R. Egnell & P. Haldén, ‘Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious: Security Sector Reform meets State 
Formation Theory’, Conflict, Security & Development Vol. 9 No. 1 (2009) pp. 48-49. 
29 Newman et al., New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, pp. 3-25, there: pp. 10-11. 
30 Ibid., pp. 3-25, there: p. 12. 
31 R. Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security Vol. 22 No. 2 
(1997) p. 56. 
32 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, pp. 187-188. 
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externally supported reconstruction.
33
 In addition, Egnell & Haldén out that the “attempt to 
achieve increased state control, legitimate government, civil society engagement and 
democratisation synchronically will be highly difficult because these factors [in modern 
countries] evolved in sequence.”34  
Regardless of these criticisms, the (neo)liberal approach remains a useful lens by which to 
look at post-Cold War international military involvement. This does not take place in a 
vacuum, but constitutes an ongoing process in which valuable lessons continue to be learned. 
This is evident from e.g. the given that “democracy assistance programs have [finally] come 
to acknowledge the role of power in making democracy possible; the plurality of paths toward 
democracy; and the importance of local conditions.”35 It is moreover observed by e.g. Berdal 
that neither the “peacekeeping failures of the early and mid-1990s […] nor the changes in the 
strategic environment spawned by the events of 11 September and their aftermath, have 
weakened a trend that has seen ‘a continued increase in international peacebuilding in the face 
of the enormous practical and legitimacy challenges’.”36 Miller, in addition, points out how 
local actors in every post-Cold War case have in fact demanded some form of democracy as 
the basis for political reconstruction; a trend which shows no sign of abating. Despite its 
imperfections, the liberal-democratic paradigm of the state thus appears to remain the 
prevalent international norm. This in turn justifies the continued focus on liberal state building 
as the paradigm of international military efforts in fragile states.
37
 
 
Miller distinguishes between five types of state failure: (1) ‘Anarchic’, (2) ‘Illegitimate’, (3) 
‘Incapable’, (4) ‘Unproductive’ and (5) ‘Barbaric’. Anarchic states lack security; Illegitimate 
states no longer possess their peoples’ belief in their claims about justice; Incapable states are 
unable to deliver public goods and services; Unproductive states cannot extract sufficient 
resources; Barbaric states treat their own peoples as enemies and systematically murder large 
numbers of them as a matter of policy. This typology also testifies to the inextricable link 
between security and legitimacy: states that are widely perceived to be illegitimate by their 
people are also most likely to experience anarchic failure. It further seems plausible that the 
imposition of security measures without regard for the norms of legitimacy is simply planting 
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the seeds for renewed armed conflict.
38
 
Similarly, barbaric policies aimed at a specific group could be legitimate in the eyes of 
government beneficiaries. In turn, the lack of physical security could be the most imminent to 
the livelihoods of particular minorities. Chronic lacks of security and contested legitimacy 
could decrease the state’s capability to deliver public goods and services. Ultimately, security 
has intrinsic value to the state’s capability to ‘espouse good governance with transparency and 
accountability and enforce law and order throughout the country’39 which grants it process 
legitimacy. In this way, the security and legitimacy domains of the state are the key focus 
areas of this inquiry.  
 
Miller describes how different historical pathways to security failure generally lead to 
different degrees of failure: (1) ‘Weak-Unstable’ states present permissive security 
environments – probably most common in newly independent states that emerged from 
imperial rule. (2) ‘Failed-Violent’ states emerged from a recent civil war and represent a 
harder security environment. (3) ‘Collapsed-Anarchic’ states are in the midst of an ongoing 
civil war and therefore represent the most difficult security environment. Local perceptions, 
moreover, form the causal mechanism that link historical circumstances to security outcomes. 
Table 1.1 matches the different strategies of rebuilding security to the degree of security 
failure in the target state.
40
  
This table, however, raises the question of how to define (in)security? First, it is important to 
acknowledge that the concept of security tends to take on very different meanings, according 
to which side of the conflict one belongs to. State actors are mostly concerned with restoring 
their monopoly over the use of force, enforcing law and order and protecting their country 
against external threats. Power contenders, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with 
the existing and perceived insecurity for the large parts of the population they represent and, 
of course, for themselves.
41
 The next part of this chapter will further elaborate on this. 
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40 Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, pp. 83, 88. 
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Table 1.1. Matching Strategy to Degree of Security Failure 
Degree of Failure Strategy of State Building 
Weak-Unstable 
Newly independent states 
Security forces minimally capable 
Combatants cooperative with DDR 
Observe 
Deploy peacekeeping force 
Monitor ceasefire 
Facilitate DDR 
Monitor security forces 
Failed-Violent 
Recent civil war 
Security forces incapable, underpaid, untrained 
Widespread, overt, organized criminality 
Train/Equip 
Provide security assistance 
Train/equip local security forces 
Embed international with local forces 
Collapsed-Anarchic 
Ongoing war 
Combatants resistant to DDR 
Administer 
Deploy peace enforcement force 
Execute combat operations and foreign internal defense 
Establish military government/transitional authority 
 
Seen from liberal state building, it is relevant to assess the restoration/establishment of the 
state’s ‘monopoly on the use of force’. This type of international military efforts are 
categorized under the ‘Train/Equip’ strategy in ‘Failed/Violent’ states. Typically, they are 
characterized by security forces that “are unable (or unwilling) to provide security, and ex-
combatants turned into criminal forces [that] threaten the state’s stability.”42 The most 
successful security strategy here would encompass the full range of what the UN calls 
Security Sector Reform and what the US military calls ‘security assistance’. These, according 
to Miller, will help to “strengthen the security institutions of the state, consolidate a ceasefire, 
and allow political and economic reconstruction to move forward.”43 Upcoming sections will 
further elaborate on (the use of) this concept. 
 
In addition to process legitimacy, Ian Hurd – a political scientist – has defined ‘legitimacy’ as 
“the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed […] when an 
actor believes a rule is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of 
retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest…control is legitimate to the extent that it is 
approved or regarded as ‘right’.”44 Hurd’s definition of legitimacy is linked to security 
because “many political conflicts are rooted in the adoption of violent strategies by societal 
actors who dispute the legitimacy of a state that they perceive to be unwilling to provide 
security and welfare to all of its citizens.”45 In turn, the state tends to criminalise all of these 
societal or non-state actors by publicly rejecting them as being illegitimate, regardless of the 
different aims, identities and interests that they represent in armed conflicts. 
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Because these actors often enjoy social legitimacy in their own environment
46
, the link 
between security and legitimacy in a post-conflict context thus becomes problematic. 
Furthermore, there are two distinguishable kinds of legitimacy in post-conflict settings: (1) the 
perceived legitimacy of the intervening force, which is both a function of its conduct, identity 
and ability to meet local expectations, and (2) the structures of governance that the 
intervening force helps to implant, nourish and consolidate.
47
 Following from this, the 
legitimacy of the intervention and the target state itself are closely interconnected; local 
populations may simply refuse to cooperate with an intervention which they view as 
illegitimate.
48
 
 
 
Table 1.2. Matching Strategy to Degree of Legitimacy Failure 
Degree of Failure Strategy of State Building 
Weak-Fragile Consensus 
* Agreement on political reconstruction in place and 
holding 
* Civil society supportive of agreement 
Observe 
* Monitor elections 
* Monitor compliance with power sharing or 
consociational agreement and establishment of 
transitional authority 
* Monitor state-civil society relations 
Failed-Widespread Disenfranchisement 
* Agreement not yet in place 
* Agreement in place but parties unwilling or unable to 
implement some provisions 
* Some civil society actors unsupportive of agreement 
Train/Equip 
* Give technical assistance to elections 
* Broker talks for power sharing or consociational 
agreement 
* Give technical assistance to transitional authority 
* Train and support civil society actors to speak out 
freely for their views 
Collapsed 
* No agreement on political reconstruction 
* Actors incapable of holding elections 
* Civil society not consulted 
Administer 
* Establish path of political reconstruction by 
international decree 
* Administer elections 
* Disempower elites of old regimes in favour of 
reformist elements in civil society 
 
Table 1.2 lists Miller’s ideal-types of legitimacy failure degrees and the subsequent strategies 
that armed state builders should pursue. This inquiry will give particular attention to post-
conflict situations in which there is a ‘weak-fragile consensus’. In such circumstances, there is 
a post-conflict agreement that presents a type of prisoners’ dilemma: actors take risks when 
they cooperate with the peace agreement “because they don’t know if all actors will 
cooperate, and each actor stands to lose if he or she invests resources in a failing process. 
Defectors stand to gain by hedging against failure, whether or not others cooperate, making 
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defection the most rational course of action.”49 Upcoming sections will further elaborate on 
these ‘spoilers’ in peace processes and explain their relation to rebuilding security and 
legitimacy.  
Miller proposes a ‘trainer strategy’ for legitimizing the fragile, post-conflict state. To this end, 
he argues that international interventions reduce the risk of cooperating and the likelihood of 
failure and thereby increase the incentive to cooperate. In his view, state builders should 
broaden participation in the peace agreements by empowering civil society representatives 
e.g. religious groups or tribal elders: civil society is “a key source of legitimacy, more active 
involvement by civil society actors can alter the terms of a peace plan, broaden the base of 
support for it, and increase the likelihood that it will be implemented.”50 Though Miller 
remains vague about the nature of this “incentive to cooperate”, it seems to imply that both 
the state and non-state signatories to a post-conflict peace agreement share an overall concern 
with safeguarding their own security and material interests. Local ownership of the peace 
process and civil society engagement are then believed to grant legitimacy to the armed state 
building effort.  
However, this ignores the more fundamental question of the ‘theory of justice’ that is to 
underpin the new cooperation in the state. In fact, there is no explicit reference to ‘justice’ in 
Miller’s modelling of legitimacy failures and rebuilding strategies. Armed groups, however, 
often engage in judicial proceedings as part of routine efforts to enforce the rule of law. In 
select cases, their role as providers of justice may even become the basis for their claims to 
legitimacy.
51
 The different roles and statuses of these non-state groups do not appear to have 
been included in Miller’s proposed strategies for rebuilding security and legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, he does make the general recommendation that armed state builders should 
provide their expertise ”based on prior experience with post-conflict agreements.”52 
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1.2. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
 
This inquiry conventionally identifies ‘post-conflict’ environments by the recent signing of 
peace agreements. These agreements need to facilitate organizational shifts toward 
conventional politics by offering incentives for political participation. According to Dudouet, 
the ‘demilitarization of politics’ requires a democratic transition to open up the political 
system to opposition groups that were previously denied representation. She notes how “in 
immediate postwar contexts, transitional democratization measures usually take the form of 
multilateral consultative mechanisms and joint decisionmaking bodies, interim power-sharing 
governments, election of a constitutional assembly, establishment of a new constitution and 
bill of rights introducing institutional and electoral reforms, or devolution of power and 
competencies to local/regional institutions.”53 Including such provisions in peace agreements 
thus helps to institutionalize the role of ex-combatants within state structures prior to 
competitive democratic elections.
54
 Paris, moreover, stresses the “problems and dangers” that 
occurred in post-conflict countries, where elections took place prior to the establishment of 
effective judicial and police institutions.
55
 Focusing on the former institution-building and 
reform related tasks thus allows us to indicate if these efforts sufficed to at least mitigate these 
problems and dangers in Somalia and Sudan. 
Post-conflict periods begin “after the (formal) termination of armed hostilities.”56 Berdal 
distinguishes between this critical early phase, when violence is pervasive and institutions are 
rudimentary, weak or non-existent and the longer-term challenges of rebuilding war-torn 
societies. This “distinction between phases is not simple and clear-cut; it is broad and often 
hazy and, indeed, cannot be defined in purely temporal terms, with the implication this 
usually carries of a sequential approach to tasks to be taken by external military or civilian 
actors.”57 Nevertheless, the formal termination of armed hostilities remains the preferred 
starting point of the case studies. This is because the provisions in peace agreements generally 
define the UN’s involvement in SSR. Typically, all of these agreements implicitly mention 
SSR-related tasks such as DDR, integration of armed forces and police reform, although none 
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of them explicitly refer to SSR.
58
  
  
To comprehend the fundamental reasons for the success or failure of peacebuilding, we have 
to consider why belligerents would prefer to continue violence over adhering to peaceful 
settlements. To this end, Snyder & Jervis have examined the explanatory value of the 
‘security dilemma’ for civil wars, albeit the term is usually applied to inter-state warfare. The 
security dilemma is “a situation in which each party’s efforts to increase its own security 
reduce the security of others.”59 Snyder & Jervis argue for an interaction between security and 
predatory motives. ‘Predators’ are actors who prefer exploiting others over cooperating with 
them, even when their imminent security threats are quite small. Their security fears are likely 
to be especially acute in an anarchical balance-of-power system where aggression provokes 
resistance and hostility among other parties. Moreover, the security dilemma often transforms 
security-driven actors into predators. This is because the enduring desire to protect one’s 
future position can still make exploiting others the preferred alternative to mutual 
cooperation.
60
 
Stedman’s work on ‘spoiler’ problems in peace processes adds that parties in civil wars differ 
in their goals and commitment. ‘Spoilers’ are “leaders and parties who believe that peace 
emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence 
to undermine attempts to achieve it.”61 According to Stedman, spoilers predominantly differ 
from each other in terms of the goals which they pursue and their commitment to achieving 
them. Furthermore, he contends that the role played by international actors, charged with 
overseeing the implementation of peace agreements, determines the spoilers’ success or 
failure. In the 1990s, these actors have pursued three major strategies to manage spoilers: (1) 
inducement: giving the spoiler what it wants, (2) socialization: changing spoiler’ behaviour to 
adhere to a set of established norms and (3) coercion: punishing spoiler behaviour or reducing 
the capacity of the spoiler to undermine the peace process.
62
  
In turn, Greenhill & Major largely concur with Stedman’s typology and the role he ascribes to 
international actors. They however reverse his logic by demonstrating that the spoiler-type 
does not determine the kinds of possible outcomes. Rather, it is the number of possible 
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outcomes that determines the type of spoilers that emerge. The analytical difference between 
Stedman and Greenhill & Major is that the latter stress the influence of structural factors over 
actors’ intentions in the implementation trajectory of peace processes. In their view, 
international actors have the responsibility to shift the ‘prevailing opportunity structure’ to 
restrict the spoiler and its room for manoeuver. Ultimately, it is the relative distribution of 
power and the availability of sufficient ‘carrots and sticks’63 determine if a spoiler will 
undermine a given peace process.
64
 
  
Similar to Greenhill & Major’s work on spoilers, the ‘relative deprivation theory’ also stresses 
structural factors in explaining renewed violence. This theory attributes collective violence to 
the gap between what a social group believes it deserves vis-à-vis what it actually receives. It 
is most relevant to the Horn of Africa
65
 and closely connected with attributing conflicts to 
ethnic identification.
66
 Furthermore, if the relative deprivation of social groups is driven by 
structural factors, then these must also play a role in the spoilers’ needs and thus help to 
explain ongoing violence. Together with security and material concerns, they provide for 
plenty of reasons to protract or worsen conflict. For instance, Snyder & Jervis argue that the 
disintegration of state authority could not only give rise to security fears, but might also 
induce behaviour that gradually renders the situation intractable. In anarchic circumstances, 
mobilized political groups – often with local support bases – could become explosively 
dangerous when their security concerns get implicated with the fate of their existence. Group 
identity can be fuelled by security concerns and thereby constitute a consequence of conflict 
as much as a cause of it.
67
  
In the 1990s, the international community adopted an institution-building approach to prevent 
the renewal of conflict. This is reflected in Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for 
Peace – which also included the first public usage of the term ‘peacebuilding’: “So at this 
moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the Organization to build peace, stability and 
security must encompass matters beyond military threats […]”, for which the UN must e.g. 
“[…] stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the 
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institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; […]”68 The twenty-first 
century Brahimi Report further stated that effective peacebuilding requires an active 
multidimensional engagement with local parties. The report also emphasized the role of 
civilian police and the rule of law for peacebuilding. In addition, it attaches key value to the 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants to ensure 
immediate post-conflict stability and reduce the likelihood of recurring conflicts. The report 
also recognized how demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return 
to a life of violence when they fail to find a legitimate alternative livelihood.
69
 The broad 
ambitions of the Brahimi Report however lead to a number of problems, as they touch on the 
realms of peacebuilding, state building and different perceptions of peace. 
 
First, there is a complex relationship between state building and peacebuilding. Whereas some 
scholars classify the former as a subtask to support peacebuilding, others point out that state 
building could undermine peace 
when it threatens the interests of 
local elites. For example, Call & 
Cousens’ definition of ‘State 
building’ as “actions undertaken 
by international or national actors 
to establish, reform or strengthen 
the institutions of the state which 
may or may not contribute to 
peacebuilding”70 (see: Table 1.4.) 
reflects this complexity and 
illustrates the need to make trade-
offs in choosing between building 
peace and building states. 
According to Miller, state 
building “is best seen as a contributor to long-term peace building by addressing the 
conditions that give rise to conflict, but also as a potentially destabilizing activity that can hurt 
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short-term prospects for peace.”71 In order to get a better grasp of this complexity, it is useful 
to distinguish between a ‘positive peace’ and a ‘negative peace’. The latter refers to the 
absence of direct violence. This reflects a narrow security interpretation of state actors, whose 
contested authority and legitimacy have given rise to the conflict. ‘Positive peace’, by 
contrast, is seen from the security perspective of self-defined resistance and liberation 
movements. Peace for them entails the fulfilment of various human needs ranging from 
personal safety to socio-economic wellbeing or political freedom.
72
  
This discrepancy, combined with the fact that state building is meant to establish, strengthen 
or reform the institutions of the state, lead to the risk that efforts to strengthen the state’s 
security apparatus will antagonize the former movements. Although these efforts would be 
part of the signed peace agreement, Miller’s view of state building still entails that to prevent 
the alienation of parties to the peace process, the military must address the “conditions that 
give rise to conflict.”73 This would e.g. mean pursuing long-term efforts to reconcile former 
adversaries who, as pointed out, have very conflicting interests to build peace. By contrast, 
Miller’s observer strategy for legitimacy building (see: Table 1.2.) seems insufficient to 
addres the ‘root causes’ of conflict, as it prescribes a mere monitoring role for the 
international military forces. 
 
Despite the considerable pitfalls, it is also crucial to not underestimate the contribution of 
armed state building to post-conflict environments. When observing periods up to two years 
after the end of war, it is clear how civil wars with any form of UN operation have nearly 
been twice as likely to enjoy success in the form of ‘participatory peacebuilding’ i.e. building 
a positive peace, than conflicts without a UN presence. (48% against 26%).
74
 After 
statistically analysing all civil wars since 1945, Doyle & Sambanis moreover conclude that 
multidimensional UN missions significantly reduce the chances of large-scale violence and 
enhance the chances for minimal political democratization.
75
 Similarly, Call & Cousens argue 
how successful state building can support the consolidation of peace. SSR activities could 
enhance mechanisms – e.g. justice systems and policing systems – for security and conflict 
resolution at the national level. This process, however, tends to be problematic as 
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international military efforts to establish national coercive institutions – armies, police or 
other forces – bear the risk of empowering some segments of the population over others. 
Should these groups have an interest to resist state authority, then empowering them could 
militate against political moderation and reconciliation and undermine institution-building and 
peacebuilding.
76
 In this way, limiting international military efforts to a narrow focus on the 
security sector could backfire against the legitimacy of the state building project or the force 
itself.
77
 
 
During the 1990s, the international community experienced the limitations of its own ability 
to restore peace and order in civil war-torn countries. This has led theorists to contend that, 
given the impossibility of devising a peacebuilding intervention strategy that takes all 
contextual variables post-conflict environments into account, the international community has 
instead opted for a disciplinary security regime to domesticate and normalize states that are 
perceived as potential sources of threat and instability.
78
 This stance is reflected in e.g. the 
changing U.S. strategic perceptions and interests in Africa after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 
2002, the White House National Security Strategy for instance ‘recognized that our security 
depends upon partnering with Africa to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring 
ungoverned areas under control of effective democracies.’79  
In this way, the peacebuilding optimism of the early 1990s transformed into a post-9/11 
security regime. Following e.g. the debacle in Somalia, the UN and US increasingly began to 
cooperate with local partners. Twenty-first century approaches to security threats therefore 
experienced a growing importance of regional organizations such as the African Union (AU).  
The AU, moreover, has strongly promoted the idea of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’, which corresponds to the inclination to close partnerships with Africa. For 
instance, it is argued that conflict management in Darfur and Somalia has become so complex 
and dangerous for foreign troops that non-African actors gladly opt for ‘African solutions’ to 
security challenges there.
80
 However, while these local partnerships may present a new 
strategic framework, there is no evidence that would suggest a departure from the same liberal 
principles that also underpinned the ‘domestication’ and ‘normalization’ of states in the 
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1990s. On the contrary, it is conceivable that the increased predominance of the international 
security agenda after 9/11 has favoured transforming behaviour in post-conflict states through 
institution-building over contextual needs to address the root causes of conflict.  
27 
 
1.3. Struggles in the Horn of Africa 
 
There are two interpretations of African state formation. The ‘mainstream’ view holds that 
colonial rule amounted to a fundamental break within African history. On the other hand, 
there are scholars who suggest a ‘moderate’ view of colonial impact on African states. Robert 
Jackson, for instance, notes the relatively small size and little executive capacity of colonial 
administrations. Terrence Ranger aims to diversify the effects of colonialism by arguing for 
“a pluralism both before, during and after colonialism”. Jeffrey Herbst, in addition, focuses on 
‘boundaries’ and ‘authority’ while placing African state formation in a wide-ranging 
comparative perspective.
81
  
In this way, Herbst explains how the failure to physically extend power of the central state 
apparatus to the rural areas led the colonialists to manipulate local structures instead. He 
contends that the European interest in Africa produced a confused and unsystematic rule, 
which is illustrated by the fact that even the official historian of the colonial office was unable 
to trace any guiding principles of the native administration during the interwar years.
82
  
This inquiry concurs with the moderate view because it is analytically better substantiated. 
Problem factors such as ‘territoriality’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘tribalism/clanism’ have become key 
mobilizers in contemporary African politics and, hence, in civil conflicts. These factors did 
undergo a transformation during and after colonialism, which makes it important to consider 
their origins and nature. 
 
Colonizers, according to Herbst, had never been interested in duplicating the same power 
infrastructures that bound cities to hinterland in their homelands. Similarly, the post-
independence leaders of Africa had no interest in organizing boundaries beyond the territories 
that were controlled by the capital cities. They recognized that violently redrawing boundaries 
would only threaten their own positions. Additionally, their colonially inherited urban-based 
state apparatus did not provide for true pan-territorial rule, partially because the new post-
independence administrations lacked time to expand their control over the country. As a 
result, national boundaries became based on the de facto territory that each state controlled. 
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The actual territory that was subordinate to state authority thus became relatively small.
83
 
Moreover, The OAU expressed reluctance to get involved in civil wars, except for situations 
in which there was clear evidence of an external military intervention.
84
  
In 2001, the OAU was replaced by the AU. Rechner examined the normative and 
peacekeeping differences between the organizations. He concludes that “the creation of a PSC 
(‘Peace and Security Council’) authorized to deal with many issues of peace and security is a 
step forward from the OAU.”85 This is echoed by Brosig, who remarks that the AU has 
expressed its commitment to protect member states’ populations against severe human rights 
violations.
86
 In doing this, the AU reflects a less rigid adherence to the principle of non-
interference by preserving “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to 
a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances (my Italics), namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”87 This suggests a growing shift from inter-state 
Westphalian sovereignty and non-interference to a more intra-state orientated and ‘human’-
centred view of security. 
 
Abbink et al. further note that studying African boundary problematics is a good start to 
develop an understanding of the conflicts related to problems of ethnicity and identity. It is 
not the presence of ethnic divisions between peoples as such that necessarily creates an 
environment for civil conflict: even the strongly divided pre-colonial Somali clans deployed a 
complex system of boundaries and demarcations, yet they lived relatively peaceful alongside 
each other. Colonial powers, however, transformed the pre-existing group dynamics by 
creating new ethnic groups, tribes and administrative units
88
 to assist them in their rule. After 
independence, this ‘ethnicization’ of African politics together with the development of 
patronage networks and personalist loyalties significantly contributed to the chronic 
instability of countries in the Horn of Africa. Notwithstanding, Lewis’ work on nationalism 
and the Somali identity identifies that “the resilience of this social [clan] system in adopting 
and adapting to the forces of ‘modernization’ has made a bewildering impression on those 
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with a Eurocentric bias who considered it incompatible with ‘progress’.”89 Thus, while 
colonial influences may have created new differences between groups of people, the extent to 
which indigenous systems of governance have persisted can indeed be considerable. 
  
The factors of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribe’ also persist as points of reference for group identities. 
Frequently too, they are used as a political instrument to mobilize groups for armed conflict. 
Here, this inquiry concurs with Thies that “African ethnicity is a political, and not a cultural 
phenomenon […] the state often is able to define ethnicity, as well as set the stage for 
competition between ethnic groups.”90 Thus, the political category of ‘ethnicity’ serves as a 
fluid identity-marker and is susceptible to political manipulation by state elites. 
In the Somalia and Sudan, there has been a complex historical and political interplay between 
‘ethnicity’ and the state. ‘Clanism’ is the Somali version of ethnicity or tribalism. According 
to Adam, the cynical manipulation of clan-related differences by Siad Barre’s regime 
ultimately led to bad governance in the Somali state. This is because the severely negative and 
destructive manipulation of clan consciousness by political elites contributed to the inability 
of civil society to recover when Siad fell from power.  
Siad, moreover, had recognized the importance of controlling other state sectors and civil 
society by means of e.g. the military, security, paramilitary, an elitist vanguard political party 
and so-called mass organizations. To this end, he modified the Soviet-introduced concept of 
nomenklatura – the appointing of loyal political agents to guide and control civil and military 
institutions – to ‘clan-katura’. This led to the establishment of security organizations along 
clan-based lines. In particular, the majority of forces in the Hangash, (military-intelligence) 
the Dabarjebinta (military-counterintelligence) and the military police were drawn from 
president Barre’s own clan. In this way, ‘clan-katura’ effectively threw conventional state 
security institutions into gridlock, jealousy, confusion and anarchy.
91
  
 
On the other hand, Sudan suffers from complex and multiple ‘society-society’ and ‘society-
state’ conflicts. Political marginalization, alienation and discrimination by the centre against 
the peripheries have plunged the country into a perpetual state of conflict since independence 
in 1956. According to Bereketeab, the society-society category is expressed by the struggle 
                                                          
89 I.M. Lewis, ‘Zichtbare en Onzichtbare Verschillen: De Somalische Paradox’, in: J. Abbink & A. van Dokkum 
(ed.), Verdeeld Afrika: Etniciteit, Conflict en de Grenzen van de Staat (Diemen 2008) pp. 42-73, there: p. 61. 
90 Thies, ‘The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa’, p. 719. 
91 H.M. Adam, ‘Somali Civil Wars’, in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), Civil Wars in Africa: Roots 
and Resolution (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) pp. 169-192, there: pp. 170-174. 
30 
 
between ‘African Christian animists’ (South) and ‘Arab Muslims’ (North). Furthermore, the 
fact that the state is dominated by the ‘Arab Muslim’ community makes this a conflict where 
the central state wages war against a section of society.
92
 In addition, Ali & Matthews stressed 
that the ideological divide in Sudan has not been along north-south lines, but between those 
who aspired to a new Sudan and those who wanted minimal changes to the status-quo. They 
point out how the rebelling Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/SPLA) linked 
the political marginalization, economic underdevelopment and cultural domination by the 
north of Sudan to national processes. 
They called for a “radical restructuring of the power of the central government in a manner 
that will end once and for all the monopolisation of power by any self-appointed gang of 
thieves and criminals, whatever their backgrounds, whether they come in the form of political 
parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers.” This, however, antagonized the 
dominant elite in Khartoum that believed it would have no configuration of power within this 
new Sudan. Therefore, the majority of the northern political and bureaucratic elites opposed 
contact with the movement. Sectarian elites, moreover, found the SPLM/SPLA’s aspirations 
particularly alarming because they perceived the movement’s demand for national unity  as a 
threat to their power bases and the foundation of their claim to legitimacy.’93 
  
Taken together, the structural factors of the ‘urban/rural divide’94 and the ‘ethnicization’ of 
politics provide ample fodder for the relative deprivation of groups. The same goes for the 
issues of territoriality, identity and belonging between the state and its people. In turn, this 
myriad of structural factors and processes culminated in the ‘crises of citizenship and 
legitimacy’ in the state, which underpin the communal conflicts that often lead to state 
disintegration.
95
 These crises take place when political discontent and a widespread sense of 
relative deprivation occur in tandem with mutual distrust and wariness among different 
groups of ‘citizens’. Ultimately, these crises may lead to the failure or total collapse of state 
institutions.
96
  
Recent work on ‘conflict constituencies’ – the segment of the population most proximate to 
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the armed movements – has linked the former crises to conflict narrative development. The 
latter occurs when “negative events and processes regarding certain volatile issues come to be 
seen as being connected to specific groups perceived to be responsible. […] Perspectives then 
spread and find fertile ground among others who feel similarly aggrieved, which renders them 
both more simplified and acute. In this way, the accumulation and aggravation of grievances 
jointly produce shared or collective narratives of injustice, which could then serve to 
rationalize certain responses.”97  
Undoubtedly, part of the problem is the fact that the post-colonial African state tended to 
institutionalize ethnic entitlements, rights and privileges. This created differentiated and 
unequal statuses of citizenship which, in turn, has made it more of a group phenomenon. 
People’s loyalties have in this way become divided, rather than united by a state through the 
tie of citizenship, with equal rights, privileges and obligations. Unsurprisingly, civil wars and 
conflicts in Africa stem therefore mostly from tensions and contradictions within the public 
sphere, when claims of marginalization, exclusion and domination among individuals and 
groups are widespread.
98
 ‘Citizenship’ has in this sense become an instrument of social 
closure, through which the state lays claim to and defines its sovereignty, authority, 
legitimacy and identity.
99
 In this way, military operational decisions e.g. whether to cooperate 
with or disarm Somali warring factions thus bear the risk of worsening existing problems by 
reifying or further entrenching particular groups. Crucially, these kind of choices remain 
inherent to the trade-off between short-term stabilization and long-term state reconstruction 
which international military forces need to make.
100
 
 
Given the problems that underpin the African state, it is often argued that the tenets of liberal 
peacebuilding – liberal democracy, human rights, market values etc. – are not necessarily 
universally applicable values. The notion of a ‘liberal peace’ moreover may not present the 
appropriate solution to conflicted or divided societies.
101
 Lonsdale already noted that “liberal 
assumptions about the development of individual citizenship were no further off the mark 
than conventional Marxist class analysis.” There was “no conviction that any social structures 
stood between individuals and full participant citizenship, other than residual communalisms 
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below and the selfish abuse of disproportionate state power above.”102 Such statements are 
based on the notion that liberal-democratic states derive from processes of modernization – 
e.g. urbanization, universal education, access to mass media and industrialization – that 
conform to states in Western Europe but do not apply to post-colonial Africa. In his analysis 
of economic growth in Africa, Englebert for instance argues that African states often lacked 
legitimacy from the beginning. They were not the result of a social contract or formed to 
reduce transaction costs. Instead, they became instruments of the ruling class to appropriate 
resources and dominate competing groups in society.
103
 Similarly, Bates concludes that the 
new African states failed to effectively engage in war making, state making, protection or 
extraction.
104
 According to Thies, this lack of modernizing processes resulted in the 
‘urban/rural’ divide and the ‘ethnicization’ of African politics105 which in turn helped to 
engender the former problem with citizenship and the absence of liberal-democratic 
‘stateness’. 
Robinson, however, demonstrates that the colonial diversity and partition of African societies 
have not rendered these states immune to the unifying effects of modernization. Her research 
is based on individual-level-survey data on ‘national vs. ethnic identification’ from a 
representative sample of citizens in sixteen African countries and a novel compilation of 
ethnic group and state-level data.
106
 Robinson concludes that living in urban areas, having 
more education and being formally employed in the modern sector are positively correlated 
with national over ethnic-group identification. Given the known, positive impact of increased 
national identification on rates of inter-ethnic cooperation, these findings become important 
for the purpose of building peace and stability in civil war-torn countries.
107
 Conversely, 
Robinson’s survey data focus on the individual level, while the crises of citizenship and 
legitimacy predominantly stem from group phenomena. In such a context, national 
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identification is likely to remain confined to urban-based people who are affiliated with the 
national government. 
Crucially, the defining and granting of citizenship is usually done by this particular group of 
people. It is an integral part of a nation-building process, led by the same power holders who 
also lay claim to the state. Mengisteab therefore asserts that “ethnic- and region-based wars in 
the Horn of Africa are essentially reflections of the challenges of state-building and nation-
building processes […].”108 Moreover, international military forces deployed to tackle the 
challenges related to state building often encounter a parallel, local development of 
institutions, mechanisms and loyalties next to the state. For example, while the territorial 
integrity of Somalia effectively vanished in the 1990s with the secession of Somaliland and 
Puntland in the north, the latter two have not been recognized by either the Somali federal 
government or the international community. Rather, they  retained their focus on Mogadishu 
as the capital of a unified state. Meanwhile, Somaliland and Puntland developed into self-
governing enclaves, providing administration to their self-declared independent republics.
109
 
 
This chapter has argued that armed state building is inextricably linked to the post-Cold War 
paradigm of liberal-democratic institutionalism. It has been argued that countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa critically deviate from the historical process of Western European state 
formation, that serves to underpin this paradigm. A wide array of structural factors and 
processes, including the urban/rural divide within the state, the ethnicization of politics and 
the subsequent development of patronage networks and clientelism have resulted in the 
relative deprivation between groups in the state. In turn, this has led to crises of citizenship 
and legitimacy in the state, which represent structural challenges to state building and help us 
to define and explain spoiler behaviour in peace processes. Furthermore, this chapter has 
explored the complex relationship between peacebuilding and state building and pointed out 
the problems of defining ‘post-conflict’ environments. We have indicated Miller’s typology 
of these environments and specified his strategies for rebuilding security and legitimacy, 
including SSR as “the most successful security strategy” in failed or violent states.110 The next 
chapter will further operationalize this key concept.  
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2. Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform 
 
“Thus, both stabilization and SSR concepts become intimately linked 
and should be considered as part of the wider state-building agenda.”111 
 
 
2.1. Defining the Concept 
 
Peacebuilding in the 1990s seems to have been flawed by the same false assumption as the 
modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s: first, the belief that developing states naturally 
evolve towards liberal market democracies and second, that this evolution becomes self-
perpetuating after initiation.
112
 In the late 1990s, the term SSR was coined in development 
policy circles upon the recognition of a close link between the previously separated fields of 
security and development. SSR has in this way been driven by “an understanding that poorly 
governed and unreformed security sectors in states are an obstacle to the promotion of 
sustainable development and democracy, as well as to peace and security.”113  
It is however important to distinguish the narrow ‘sector’ from the wider ‘system’. Jackson 
indicates this difference by noting that the acronym ‘SSR’ initially referred to security sector 
reform but within the OECD has come to denote security system reform. The widening of this 
conceptual scope occurred together with an increasing shift from the ‘hard’ security of 
militaries towards the ‘soft’ security of the human security agenda.114  Contrary to the narrow 
‘state security’, the broader notion of ‘human security’ does not limit security conditions to 
traditional matters e.g. national defence and law and order. They rather incorporate broader 
political, economic and social issues to ensure a life free from risk and danger.
115
  
 
According to Jackson, the conceptual difference between the ‘sector’ and the ‘system’ is more 
                                                          
111 A. Fitz-Gerald, ‘Stabilization Operations and Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform: Strange Bedfellows or 
Close Allies?’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), The Future of Security Sector Reform © (CIGI) – The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 154-168, there: p. 159. 
112 Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, p. 57. 
113 Egnell & Haldén, ‘Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious’, pp. 29-30. 
114 P. Jackson, ‘Security Sector Reform and State Building’, Third World Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 10 (2011) p. 
1811. 
115 N. Ball, ‘The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), The Future of Security 
Sector Reform  
© (CIGI) – The Centre forInternational Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 29-44, there: p. 32. 
35 
 
than mere semantics: it represents a deeper debate over the scope and boundaries involved in 
the security area.
116
 This corresponds to Hänggi & Scherrer’s division between the ‘narrow’ 
and ‘broader’ notions of SSR. The former reflects a traditional state-centric understanding of 
security by focusing on the public sector institutions charged with the provision of internal 
and external security, as well as on the civilian bodies relevant to their management, control 
and oversight. The latter also includes the ‘justice sector’ in recognizing the linkages and 
complementary relationship between security and justice.  
Broader understandings of SSR, moreover, emphasize that civil society organizations have an 
important role to play in monitoring government policy and practice on security and justice 
issues.
117
 Likewise, Miller emphasises the importance of empowering civil society to grant 
legitimacy to fragile post-conflict states. However, it seems that attempts by religious groups 
or tribal leaders to “decentralize the government and deconcentrate power away from the 
executive”118 would contradict the security perception of state actors. Similarly, failing to 
include civil society actors in the peace process would effectively undermine the positive 
peace that is preferred by non-state resistance and liberation movements. In this way, the 
conflicting security perceptions and material interests of state and non-state actors alike could 
seriously hamper post-conflict state building. International military forces charged with 
implementing confidence-building measures to reconcile these epistemologically different 
groups moreover face the problem of targeting them. In Somalia, for instance, civil society is 
particularly hard to define: any social or civic organization has basically been a ‘non-state 
actor’ since the collapse of the central government in 1991.119 
 
Figure 2.1. displays the UK Department for International Development’s understanding of the 
‘security sector’.120 This inquiry perceives security sector reform as a predominantly security 
orientated affair that covers the state’s ‘core security actors’, the non-state’s ‘non statutory 
forces’ and their ‘security management and oversight bodies’. This broad understanding of the 
‘security sector’ is also presented in the OECD/DAC’s Handbook on Security System Reform, 
which includes “all those institutions, groups organisations and individuals – both state and 
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non-state – that have a stake 
in security and justice 
provision.”121 Next, by 
including ‘justice and law 
enforcement’ institutions’ in 
security system reform, this 
inquiry concurs with the 
broad definition found in the 
SSR literature. This states 
how post-conflict SSR is 
bound up with the wider 
process of state-building and 
chiefly characterized by a 
high level of influence of   Figure 2.1. Relations between Security Actors and Institutions 
external actors.
122
  
Moreover, the aim of ‘state building’ to “establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the 
state”123 also includes justice and law enforcement institutions. States, in addition, claim 
legitimacy by invoking their own theories of justice, which validate their actions, coercion 
and existence.
124
 This makes it important to consider the judicial and penal institutions by 
which the state, in theory, provides security and claims legitimacy through upholding the rule 
of law. The next section of this chapter shall discuss this matter at greater length.  
 
In 2008, the UN described the ‘security sector’ as “the structures, institutions and personnel 
responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country.”125 Efforts 
within the core ‘security’ realm thus pertain to traditional security actors and their civilian 
management and oversight bodies. Together, these should theoretically enable the state to 
provide security in legitimate ways. The progress – or lack thereof – made in Disarmament, 
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Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) offers a tool for measuring the reestablishment of 
the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in post-conflict settings. Traditionally, DDR has 
been treated as a separate issue or discipline that only has common features with SSR. 
According to Knight, SSR in post-conflict environments can best be understood as the state’s 
equivalent to insurgency movements undergoing a DDR process. There is, furthermore, the 
idea that SSR will follow-on from DDR and that DDR represents an entry point for SSR. 
Moreover, DDR is predominantly intended to return the monopoly of force to the state and 
thereby is considered sequential (first ‘D’, then ‘D’, then ‘R’). By comparison, SSR is 
exclusively focused on the state’s apparatus engaged in the monopoly on the use of force, 
which is conceived as an open-ended process.
126
  
However, given the potential overlap between actors in the security sector (see: Figure 2.1.), it 
is important to consider that former combatants could act as both state-related and non-
statutory security actors. The legitimacy of these actors in their different capacities in turn 
may influence the post-conflict armed state building project. Rees, for instance, states that ex-
combatants should be viewed as key players in SSR as they consistently seek to manipulate or 
dominate indigenous security sector institutions: “Without their consent, or participation in, 
SSR will fail.”127 Significantly, the practice of DDR could have implications for both security 
and legitimacy within post-conflict state building. The incorporation of DDR projects as a 
discrete part of detainee operations may provide a bridge between the removal of imminent 
security threats on the one hand, and community-based justice, reconciliation and 
reconstruction efforts on the other.
128
 Thankfully, civil society organizations produce studies 
that e.g. measure de facto security improvements after DDR and the security perceptions of 
the civilian communities involved. These perceptions allow us to identify the impact of DDR 
on the relationship between citizens and their government.
129
 
It has already been indicated that peace can either be ‘positive’ or ‘negative.’ Essentially, this 
reflects the discrepancy between the narrow interests of state actors and the broad aspirations 
of non-statutory actors. The same phenomenon appears to occur between the international 
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military forces and the civil society organizations which, according to Miller, are “a key 
source of legitimacy.”130 For instance, Hänggi & Scherrer observe that post-conflict 
environments are typically characterized by a discrepancy between the peacekeeping 
community, i.e. international military forces and the state actors whose cooperation they 
require, and the conflict-transformation community which also includes civilian 
organizations. The former views Security Sector Reform – emphasizing security actor 
capacity-building – as a short-term exit strategy. The latter considers Security System Reform 
– emphasizing the governance dimension – as a component of a longer-term reconstruction 
and development.
131
  
 
Recent contributions to the study of SSR have increasingly began emphasizing the latter 
governance dimension. In 2008, the UN for instance stated how “ideally, security sector 
reform should begin at the outset of a peace process and should be incorporated into early 
recovery and development strategies.”132 In 2010, the Executive Director of the Centre for 
Security Governance added that SSR is innately a political process which, in post-conflict 
contexts, should be incorporated into the peace agreement or political settlement.
133
 SSR 
[should], moreover, move far beyond narrow technical definitions of security institutions. 
Instead, it should follow a more ambitious agenda of reconstructing or strengthening the 
state’s ability to govern the security sector. This, in turn, should be done in a way that serves 
the population as a whole rather than a narrow political elite.
134
  
Thus, a general consensus has developed that SSR is a “highly political process which […] is 
inherently linked to […] relationships between different institutions and groups within a 
country.”135 For instance, Wulf has defined the concept in a way that appears to reconcile the 
former division in scope between the ‘sector’ and the ‘system’, stating that Security Sector 
Reform is “the transformation of the security system (my Italics) which includes all the actors, 
their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is 
more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus 
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contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”136 This is deemed necessary because 
“responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for 
citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development.”137 For this reason, the 
overall objective of SSR is to “contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to 
development.”138  
 
Jackson, however observes that the study of SSR efforts is a relatively new field which has 
been subject to so-called ‘benign analytical neglect.’ Rather than being rooted in conceptual 
or theoretical approaches, much of the literature on SSR has focused on practical, policy-
related analysis. As a result, the work on SSR has largely been very specific. It has focused on 
particular activities rather than conceiving them within a framework of broader interventions 
as an expression of, and in relation to, wider social and economic reform.
139
  
Egnell & Haldén arrived at a similar conclusion, stating that the “lack of contextual 
understanding of the aims of SSR activities and state-building, as well as of the host countries 
in which such activities take place, has created an ad hoc and piecemeal approach to SSR 
based on normative assumptions rather than theoretically and historically informed strategies 
for the specific operational context.”140 Illustrative of this is the example of the British 
intervention in Sierra Leone from 1997-2007. The process here is deemed successful: 
although Sierra Leone remains near the bottom of the HDI, the conflict has ended, the police 
and military function well and justice is available at some level to most people. On the other 
hand, the political and civil control over these institutions remains weak, which means that 
SSR-led state building in Sierra Leone led to the development of a competent security sector 
‘within a vacuum.’ In order to make SSR more effective, the reforms need to be part of a 
broader process of state formation.
141
  
In this regard, Egnell & Haldén point out that while many of the activities associated with 
SSR are not in any way new, the concept epitomizes an important novelty by introducing a 
coherent, coordinated approach to such activities. Furthermore, while most other concepts 
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within the comprehensive or holistic school of thought come from defence thinkers, the 
concept of SSR derives from the development community. Thereby, it represents a significant 
junction in the security-development nexus, involving all concerned actors from development 
agencies to military peacekeepers.
142
 However, Mannitz remarks that while state institutions 
must be included in SSR, it is insufficient to direct the intended changes at this formal sector 
alone. Crucially, researchers have found that ‘external actors are particularly ill-equipped to 
deal with the informal sector.
143
 In particular,  post-conflict contexts are generally 
characterized by populations that are mistrustful of security services and frequently hostile to 
organizations that could be perceived as a direct threat to their own individual security.  
 
In turn, post-conflict SSR seeks to construct states that are ‘capable’ in a liberal sense, i.e. 
provide good governance, democracy and security. These military interventions seek to 
develop security systems that provide security to both the indigenous populations and the 
international community of states as a whole.
144
 However, many post-conflict countries lack 
exactly the kind of political leadership that would be able and/or willing to deliver security as 
a public good for all. For this reason, SSR programmes that merely include the ruling elites of 
the state face the risk of contributing to the prolonged existence of dysfunctional governance 
and unequal access to political power.
145
  
In addition, SSR interventions in troubled post-conflict situations naturally also contain 
elements of stabilization. The main features of post-conflict SSR usually are the need to 
provide immediate security, the need to demobilize and reintegrate combatants and the need 
to downsize security actors.
146
 Especially in failed or violent security environments, it may be 
more tempting for international actors to opt for a ‘stabilizing’ exit-strategy of train-and-equip 
efforts rather than incorporating the broader aims of SSR, which would require the 
intervention to become a long-term commitment. Conversely, both of these approaches should 
be considered part of the wider state building agenda.
147
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2.2. Problems and Pitfalls 
 
This section attempts to indicate the possible problems and pitfalls for SSR regarding the ‘rule 
of law’ and ‘local ownership’. A key problem in post-conflict environments is the 
establishment of the rule of law, defined as 
“that system which defines the broad 
parameters of the citizens’ relationship to the 
state and vice versa as well as amongst 
themselves.”148 (see: Figure 2.2.)  
In the Horn of Africa, the bond between 
citizens and states has however been 
historically disturbed and fundamentally 
deteriorated through crises of citizenship and 
legitimacy. In particular, there are 
conflicting perceptions of the ‘citizen/state’ 
relationship between international actors   Figure 2.2.  A Circular Relationship  
and local communities.  
Reno, for instance, introduces the notion of a ‘rebel citizenship’ or a local social contract 
between community members and armed fighters. Inhabitants of Darfur speak of these 
community members as the “immediate support base for the armed movements, providing 
them with legitimacy, shelter, materiel and recruits, and the primary participants in narrative 
formation and development.”149 This particular relationship stands at odds with most 
international NGOs that propagate the extension of individual civil and political rights to 
people in conflict zones.
150
 Similar findings emerge from a U.S. panel discussion on the 
implementation of security sector reform. Rather than trusting government institutions and 
forces, local militias are often drawn from and are closely associated with village, community 
or tribal societies.  
Next, these local militias often become the ‘protectors of last resort’ for communities which 
cannot rely on functioning state security forces. Crucially, while intervening forces may 
achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with these militias in such situations, the 
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latters’ legitimacy typically does not extend to the broader district or provincial level.151 In 
post-conflict environments, security and legitimacy thus tend to become severely localized 
and fragmented. SSR approaches, in turn, have increasingly become top-down and focused on 
state institutional development.
152
 The result has been a problematic “disconnect between the 
reality of plural security and justice providers and donor-led state-centric security and justice 
reform.”153 
 
Importantly, the very focus on rule of law (re)establishment efforts responds to a top-down, 
institutional logic of state development. It presupposes that the state’s security and justice 
sectors enforce the rule of law. If there would be no monopoly on the legitimate use of force, 
then state security services could thus not legitimately enforce the rule of law. State laws that 
would be enforced nonetheless are then unlikely to be perceived as legitimate by the 
populace, together with the state and security actors behind them. In this way, the process of 
(re)establishing of the rule of law can be used as a tool to measure state-society relations. This 
(re)establishment can also be viewed as a means to improve the legitimacy of the state by 
making it accountable to laws.  
For instance, Van Veen & Derks argue that justice bodies and security forces “need to 
become increasingly accountable if they are to retain legitimacy and confidence.”154 
Moreover, the promotion of the rule of law directly addresses the issue of legal accountability 
by “making the state abide by law, ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, 
providing efficient and impartial justice, and upholding human rights.”155 These are vast 
challenges in post-conflict environments, where state institutions have become either absent, 
weak or oppressive. In this sense, international military efforts to (re)establish the rule of law 
could at provide insights into the problems with the relations between the citizen/state and the 
security sector. 
Following from here, Denney notes that while it might be true that people in some instances 
rely on a more plural set of security and justice providers because the state is weak, absent or 
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oppressive, it is important to take such plurality seriously rather than dismissing it as the 
result of ‘unfinished’ development. Instead, she argues that “these states should not be 
considered from the perspective of being ‘not yet properly built’, but from a perspective that 
tries to ‘comprehend the context of what truly constitutes political order in those regions of 
apparent fragility.’”156 Similarly, critics of the liberal peace approach concede that what is 
“really required is a rebalancing of external regulation and internal voice that could lead to an 
effective state that is locally accountable.”157 
 
Despite these criticisms, it is also observed that “while virtually all current analysts accept 
that there are problems with the nation-state in many of the contexts in which states are 
failing, there is still a tendency to accept the technocratic parameters of state building.  
This casts the nation-state as the norm in international relations, ignoring […] particularly the 
intra-state nature of much conflict, international conflict actors and also the role of the state 
itself as an actor in non-state conflict. There remains an assumption that if we can develop the 
right mixture of policies then we can create a healthy nation-state which can exist in the 
international order […].”158  
The continued focus on technocratic state building is not unjustified. Indeed, there exists an 
understanding that effective security services and justice institutions – accountable to elected 
officials and citizens – are critical to economic and social well-being. Furthermore, the 
activities of civil society organizations around the world demonstrate that the principles of 
liberal-democratic state building – transparency, accountability, inclusiveness etc. – are 
widely supported.
159
 These organizations, however, have criticized the top-down approach to 
SSR for assuming that policies, developed at the national level, would adequately consider or 
reflect the needs of the people and local communities. This has led authors e.g. Caparini to 
maintain that civil society has largely continued to be marginalized from efforts to foster local 
ownership of SSR, despite the growing recognition that excluding civil society representatives 
is harmful to long-term development.
160
 
 
The principle of ‘local ownership’ takes as its basis the notion that reforms need to be shaped 
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and driven by local actors to be properly implemented and sustained.
161
 In practical terms, the 
‘local ownership’ of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities 
in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than 
external ones.
162
 However, Wilén & Chapaux point out the problem of deciding who the local 
actors are and how they concretely should get involved? Moreover, state-builders often prefer 
to work with local elites who have a specific set of Western credentials, such as education and 
English language proficiency. In many cases, however, this elite has little or no contact at all 
with the reality facing the majority of the local population.
163
 In turn, the practice of SSR 
deploys a concept in which the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and a role 
of being the security service provider. However, the provision of security services to the 
people has generally not been the preoccupation of ruling authorities in Africa.
164
 In addition, 
Baker argues that persisting with the state-centric paradigm and its normative emphasis on the 
necessity of a state monopoly on force will only bring disappointment: the post-conflict state 
is unable (and unwilling) to deliver policing to a majority of its population and neither is it the 
principal actor in policing provision.
165
  
It is therefore a considerable pitfall that ‘local ownership’ has gradually come to mean 
‘national ownership,’166 which exclusively focused on the government and narrow political 
elites. For instance, the UNSC states that SSR “should be a nationally owned process that is 
rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question.”167 However, 
overemphasizing the ownership of the central government in the context of Sub-Saharan 
Africa could mean that important non-aligned communities are bypassed in the reform 
process. Given that state actors’ peace and security interests are mostly a reflection of their 
own desires for self-preservation, too much ownership on their behalf could therefore create 
the circumstances for renewed conflict.  
Crucially, while the “SSR community has a good idea of how civil society operates in liberal-
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democratic states […]. Post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, however, are “complex 
spaces, not blank slates devoid of civil society, as is often assumed.” This is part of the 
frequently noted continuing failure to contextualize SSR assistance: to better understand the 
specific history and socio-political environment in which SSR programs are planned and 
implemented. This includes knowing the nature of contemporary state-society relations within 
a given, post-conflict setting.
168
 For instance, Reno argues that the historical state-building 
process helps to explain why some groups would be more willing or able than others to 
pursue a long-term strategy of cooperation. A key generalisation is that leaders who appear in 
areas that were marginal to pre-conflict patronage networks subsequently have to rely on 
locally legitimate authorities to provide them with access to resources and organised armed 
combatants.  
For example, Northern Somali elites had to rely on local elders to protect their dealings in the 
smuggling trade against presidential interference. These elders also managed the use of local 
customary social arrangements to guarantee contracts, given that the elites could not rely on 
formal courts or the president’s militias for their protection. Conversely, the Somali areas 
which had their pre-war patronage networks based in Mogadishu had the most dominated 
economies and remained the most fractured and violent.
169
 In 1989, a visitor to the north 
contrasted it to southern Somalia by noting “the difficulty of shooting young apprentice 
shiftas [bandits] because their clan and family backgrounds had to be taken into account, and 
the same holds for any person who might kill.”170 In this way, informal networks constitute a 
structural reality in which the institutions of the state may be subordinate or of secondary 
importance.
171
 
 
Finally, post-conflict environments typically express a discrepancy between the peacekeeping 
community and the broader conflict-transformation community. The former views SSR as a 
short-term exit strategy and therefore emphasizes security actor capacity-building; the latter 
sees it as a component of longer-term reconstruction and development and stresses the 
governance dimension. Similar differences can also be identified in the conflicting 
perceptions of peace (‘negative’ vs. ‘positive’) and security (‘state’ vs. ‘human’) between 
respectively state and non-state actors. These contrasts in turn make it very difficult to grant 
the ownership of the reforms to either state or non-state actors.  
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Crucially, SSR requires the close collaboration between these epistemically very different 
groups of people, which appear to have different ideas on which parts of SSR should be 
adopted and how they should be practiced. This is particularly critical when it comes to 
human security, given the (unwritten) assumption that it can best be served by creating a 
functioning state that will then provide security as a public good. However, human security 
can be defined as ‘freedom from fear’ or as citizen security in terms of people’s entitlement to 
protection by the state in which they are citizens. Both of these remain elusive
172
 given the 
crises of citizenship and legitimacy in the state to which the problems with the local 
ownership are connected. On the other hand, the conflicting views and interests of local 
actors, combined with the lack of a common definition and approach in the international arena 
have helped to sustain Security Sector/System Reform as a piecemeal strategy for post-conflict 
state building. 
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3. Confronting State Failure in Somalia 
 
“Even in Somalia, the UN force did not resolve the underlying political issues, 
and once it withdrew chaos was quick to return.”173 
 
3.1. UNOSOM-II in Somalia 
 
After the downfall of President 
Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war 
broke out in Somalia between 
the faction that supported the 
Interim President Ali Mahdi 
Mohamed and the one that 
supported General Mohamed 
Farah Aidid. Together with the 
OAU and other organizations, 
the UN sought to resolve the 
conflict. In April 1992, the 
UNSC therefore established the 
United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM-I). This  
174
 was followed by the 
establishment of the United Task Force (UNITAF) in November, 1992, which was authorized 
by the UNSC to use “all necessary means to establish a secure environment for the relief 
effort.”175 In early 1993, the Secretary-General subsequently organized a meeting in which 
fourteen Somali political movements agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to hand over all 
weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM-I. In addition, the leaders of fifteen Somali political 
movements endorsed an accord on disarmament, reconstruction and the formation of a 
transitional government. In March 1993, the Secretary-General reported that the presence and 
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operations of UNITAF had a “positive impact on the security situation in Somalia […].”176  
He, however, also pointed out that a secure environment had not yet been established in 
Somalia: there still was no effective functioning government in the country, no organized 
civilian police force and no disciplined national armed force. The Secretary-General therefore 
concluded that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM-II should endow the latter with 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enable it to establish a secure 
environment throughout Somalia. Under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, 
the new UNOSOM-II mission would thus seek to “complete, through disarmament and 
reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability and order.”177 
 
In February 1994, the UNSC revised UNOSOM-II’s mandate to encourage and assist the 
Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements. The UNSC then revised 
UNOSOM-II’s mandate to encourage and assist the Somali parties in implementing the Addis 
Ababa Agreements. Signed in March 1993 by fifteen Somali political movements, these 
agreements represented a UN-sponsored framework to build peace by e.g. rebuilding the 
political and administrative structures in Somalia. Moreover, the signatories to the Addis 
Ababa Agreements – including General Aidid’s faction – committed themselves to “complete, 
and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country in accordance with the 
disarmament concept and timeframe set by the Cease-fire Agreement of January 1991.” 
Furthermore, they agreed on the “need to establish an impartial National and Regional Somali 
Police Force in all regions of the country […] through the reinstatement of the former Somali 
Police Force and recruitment and training of young Somalis from all regions.”178  
In this way, the Addis Ababa Agreements reflected a traditional state-centric understanding of 
security: it focused on public sector institutions that were charged with the provision of 
internal security, as well as on the civilian bodies relevant to their management, control and 
oversight. Meanwhile, the provision of external security now became the responsibility of 
UNOSOM/UNITAF forces.
179
  Furthermore, the liberal-democratic content of this state-
centrism is clearly reflected in the mission’s mandate to assist in the reorganisation of the 
Somali police and judicial system and in the ongoing political process, given that the latter 
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“should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government.”180  
In terms of armed state building, the security environment represented a clear example of a 
‘Failed/Violent’ state: there recently had been a civil war and the security forces were 
incapable, underpaid and untrained. (see: Table 1.1) However, despite the emphasis on broad 
police and judicial reform, these efforts did however not constitute a SSR process that began 
“at the outset of a peace process” or had been “incorporated into early recovery and 
development strategies.”181 Historically, the concept of Security Sector/System Reform did not 
even enter policy discourse until 1997.
182
 This means that the mission could not possible have 
adopted the same grounded doctrine as the subsequent AMISOM. Nevertheless, the mission’s 
firm emphasis on police and judicial reorganisation and disarmament does constitute at least a 
few key tenets of subsequent SSR approaches.  
 
On the basis of the Addis Ababa Agreements, senior officers from both UNITAF and 
UNOSOM developed a ‘Somalia Ceasefire Disarmament Concept’. This required the 
“establishment of cantonment, for storage of heavy weapons, as well as transition sites for 
temporary accommodation of factional forces while they turned in their small arms, registered 
for future governmental and non-governmental support and received training for eventual 
reintegration into civilian life.”183 With respect to this initiated DDR-programme, the UN 
Secretary-General reported in May 1994 that “the Somali faction leaders explicitly expressed 
their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. Regrettably, this commitment has not 
yet been honoured. Voluntary disarmament will be successful only if the Somali parties 
display the necessary determination to settle their disputes peacefully.”184 Only two months 
later, the Secretary-General noted that “it is evident that militias have been rearming and 
replenishing their weapons supplies.”185 
It would not take long before the UN observed the reasons behind these rearmaments and 
replenishments: “While some progress has been registered at the local and regional levels in 
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the implementation of this Agreement, repeated violations of the cease-fire and lack of 
progress in disarmament, as well as factional disputes, inter-clan rivalries and conflicts have 
made it impossible to proceed with the establishment of a central administrative 
mechanism.”186 Thus, even though it had been one of the main mandated tasks, the mission 
made little to no progress with disarmament activities. Illustrative of this is the fact that the 
word ‘disarmament’ does not appear at all anymore in the Secretary-General’s final (publicly 
available) report on the situation in Somalia.   
 
Because DDR is often seen as an entry point for SSR
187
, the problems that were encountered 
in the disarmament phase could therefore undermine longer-term reform efforts of the state’s 
security and justice institutions. Crucially, UNOSOM-II lacked a “clear vision of how 
reconciliation should proceed.”188 There also was “no clear evidence of political will on the 
part of the warring parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution.”189 Without first 
addressing these problems and their violent consequences, it retrospectively could have been 
expected that the police and justice programmes would have become unsustainable as well. 
With regard to the police programme, the Secretary-General reported that by March 1995 
UNOSOM-II had assisted in the reestablishment of a 8.500-strong Somali police force that 
was operational in 82 district stations. These officers had a visible presence on the roads and 
in various communities: “They engaged in foot or mobile patrols and other forms of static and 
fixed-point duties, receiving complaints from the public and conducting investigations into 
criminal cases.”190 Regarding the justice sector, UNOSOM-II in turn supported the 
establishment of 11 appeal courts, 11 regional courts and 46 district courts functioning in all 
regions and 46 districts of Somalia, with a total staff of 374. In addition, the mission provided 
training for judicial personnel in judicial administration and ethics, juvenile justice, 
sentencing practices and attitudes, human rights and the rule of law.191 
At first sight, these would seem significant capacity improvements of the security and justice 
institutions of the Somali state. However, the mission did not make any attempts to address 
the root causes of the aforementioned, ongoing violence and lack of political will among the 
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parties. Conversely, the UN Secretary-General stressed that “the most the international 
community could do for the Somali parties was to afford every opportunity for them to agree 
among themselves on the modalities to re-establish their political and administrative 
structures based on a broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their 
country.”192 UNOSOM-II did however manage to assist in the formation of fifty-three district 
councils out of eighty-one and eight out of thirteen regional councils.193 In theory, this should 
have helped to re-establish the former structures. In practice, however, affording the Somali 
parties “every opportunity” alone clearly did not suffice. 
 
Moreover, UNOSOM-II lacked a strategy for the transition from a failed state to a 
democratically elected government. Clarke & Herbst state that “in Somalia there was no clear 
vision of how reconciliation should proceed. […] The expectation was that the combatants, 
after years of fighting a civil war, could somehow resolve their differences in a few 
months.”194 In this sense, a lack of ‘local ownership’ to the efforts also appears to have 
alienated Somalis from the process. For instance, other than a general declaration that the 
“uprooting of banditry and crime is necessary for peace, stability, security, reconciliation, 
reconstruction and development in Somalia,”195 there was no real clarity on how Somali 
actors could accomplish these objectives themselves or how much agency they have in the 
process. Adam furthermore criticizes UNOSOM for lacking insight into the general situation. 
He argues that the mission’s disarmament strategy would have needed a demobilization 
program to provide job-training for youth militias, a serious program to train and equip local 
police forces and a program to equip and restore the judicial system.
196
  
Conversely, the mission did not promote demobilization programs during its mandate in 
southern Somalia. Meanwhile, the northern Republic of Somaliland began to carry out 
demobilization programs on its own behalf. This phenomenon reflects a much higher degree 
of ‘local ownership’ than the police training programme, in which UNOSOM-II forces 
increasingly undertook joint operations with the Somali police to help ensure their 
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participation in security activities.
197
 However, the historical context of the mission should be 
observed. UNOSOM-II was the first real test case of post-Cold War peacekeeping, which 
means that most lessons still had to be learned. This made the mission highly prone to 
misjudgements and failures. 
The qualitative contribution of UNOSOM-II to security in Somalia was therefore small. Both 
the disarmament and police programmes had the characteristics of exit-strategies, aimed at  
providing short-term stability by training and equipping rather than establishing long-term 
reform. This corresponds to the fact that “following the commencement of the withdrawal of 
UNOSOM-II, vehicles and military equipment in stock from supplies provided by the donor 
community were shipped out of Somalia […]” and “international support for the programme, 
which included payment of salaries for the Somali police, ceased on 31 March 1995 with the 
expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate.”198 It is probable that the security conditions would 
deteriorate if the Somali police stopped receiving salaries. Indeed, Ali & Matthews point out 
that with the exception of Somaliland – which has declared its (internationally unrecognized) 
independence and established a modicum of stability – the inter-clan fighting continues 
especially in and around Mogadishu. The structures of the central state remain in a state of 
collapse.199   
 
Given the warring parties’ lack of political will to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution, 
the presence of UNOSOM-II arguably failed to provide a legitimate basis for peace in 
Somalia. In turn, the mission’s leadership had never been concerned with its own role in 
resolving the communal conflicts. Instead, it focused exclusively on a short-term exit-strategy 
which arguably did not change the prevailing opportunity-structure of the situation.  
For instance, the Secretary-General reported in August 1994 that “certain members of the 
Security Council, as well as many troop contributing countries, have conveyed to me in clear 
terms that they are not prepared to continue indefinitely their costly commitments, particularly 
when there are no encouraging signs of the Somali leader’s readiness to assume responsibility 
[…] on the basis of a durable national reconciliation.” Furthermore, “the Security Council 
may wish to address a direct message to the principal Somali leaders to remind them that the 
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future of their country lies in their hands.”200  
Looking at figure 2.1, it is tenable that UNOSOM-II ultimately only ended up addressing the 
‘security actors and forces’ whilst severely underestimating the problems that underpinned the 
establishment of civilian ‘management and oversight bodies.’ The mission assumed that these 
would emerge naturally out of a national reconciliation process. Crucially, this was never 
fulfilled during the mission’s mandate, thus the monopoly on violence of the state was not 
restored and Somalia remained highly insecure. Illustrative of this is the fact that the country 
has consistently topped the FSI for more than ten years after the UNOSOM-II intervention.201 
Given that the civilian management and oversight structures were lagging behind, together 
with the broader political and administrative structures behind them, the Somali security 
sector was thus strengthened in a vacuum.  
 
Importantly, there seems to have 
been a major underappreciation of 
the degree to which Somalia 
experienced a legitimacy failure in 
the 1990s. According to Miller’s 
typology (see: Table 1.2) the fact 
that there was an agreement in place 
means that the international military 
forces should have adopted an 
observer strategy for rebuilding 
legitimacy. The image of troops that monitor compliance with power sharing agreements, 
with the establishment of transitional authority and monitor state-civil society relations
202
 is 
indeed what emerges from the accounts of the Secretary-General. However, the deteriorating 
security and political situation in Somalia throughout UNOSOM-II’s deployment suggests 
that a more proactive strategy would have suited better. This mismatch between strategy and 
reality increases the likelihood that the mission itself came to suffer from legitimacy problems 
that, in turn, could have helped to induce spoiler behaviour.  
To further substantiate this, we also need to consider the legitimacy of possible outcomes to 
the peace process as an explanatory tool for spoiler behaviour. Unfortunately, there are 
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methodological problems in measuring contributions to the legitimacy domain. In Somalia, 
there has been no functional, central governing authority since January 1991. Prior to 1996,  
the country did not experience at least modest levels of administration that maintained a level 
of peace and rule of law. As a consequence, the period in which the mission had been 
deployed lacks formal records. Crucially, because Somali indigenous sources have not been 
documented, they are now absent at worst or scattered/fragmented at best.  
An additional problem is the fact that the majority of Somali media were only founded at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century with the formation of transitional governments. (see: figure 
3.1.) The lack of primary sources from local media during the period of UNOSOM-II’s 
activities thus makes it impossible to measure contributions to the legitimacy domain by 
qualitative analyses of public discourse. With respect to non-Somali discourse, Luling 
remarks that “well before the departure of the last UN troops, Somalia had almost vanished 
from the international news media. Since then, the Somali people have been left, with greatly 
reduced support and interference from abroad, to struggle with the problem of what comes 
next.”203  
 
However, in October and November 1993, The New York Times published two articles that 
might offer insight into the legitimacy of the mission: 
 
“”Boutros Boutros-Ghali has bombed us and murdered us!” A man screamed through a loudspeaker. “We do 
not want him here!” The crowd, mostly women and children, paraded with “Long Live Aidid” banners and 
chorused back: “Boutros-Ghali down! Unosom down!””204 
 
“Asked whether his move would not undermine the Addis Ababa meeting, the general [Aidid] said this was not 
his aim, but he repeated his view that the United Nations presence should be replaced. “Unosom has failed 
because it has prescribed the medicine before it knows the disease,” he said, referring to the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia.”205 
 
Given the Secretary-General’s ample references to threats and attacks by violent militias 
against UNOSOM troops throughout 1994 and in 1995, it can safely be suggested that the 
mission lacked legitimacy among local actors in its field of operation. Furthermore, it seems 
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that the UN-sponsored and US-backed manhunt on General Aidid from June to October 1993 
significantly contributed to the declining legitimacy of the UN forces. This forced attempt to 
remove General Aidid from the playing field even though he retained his status as a key 
political and military figure led to the killing of eighteen American soldiers in the ‘Black 
Hawk Down’ catastrophe.206 Subsequently, the fact that General Aidid organized his own 
‘Somalis for Somalia’ peace conference (including all Somali groups present at the Addis 
Ababa meeting) while confirming that he would not take part in the UN-sponsored 
conference207 might demonstrate that he indeed wanted peace, but on different terms. Here, it 
can be suggested that the politicized, clan-based antagonisms of the Siad Barre-regime were 
incompatible with the apparently voluntary national reconciliation as propagated by the UN. 
The former has resulted in crises of citizenship and legitimacy in Somalia, while the latter 
assumes that all Somali clan-based groups would simply put their grievances aside and work 
towards the installation of a democratically elected government. 
 
In this way, the mission ignored the historical legacy of the Siad Barre era. During Siad’s 
reign, it were the Daarood who held power through him, but not all of them. The three clans 
whom he used as his chief supporters were his own clan the Mareexaan, and the Ogaadeen 
and Dhulbahante (connected to him through marriage). All of these are Daarood, but so are 
the Majeerteen who became one of the main opposition forces, as eventually did a section of 
the Ogaadeen. At the same time there was fierce competition within these large groupings, 
between their constituent lineages, for jobs and the spoils of office. In this way, the anti-
government movements which overthrew Siad were based on clans or clan-families and 
became the contestants in the civil war.
208
 
In addition, the UN-led attempt at state building in this context disregarded the Somalis’ 
fundamental lack of trust in central government. As one young Somali man put it: “Because 
of the past five years, Somalis have come to rely on themselves, and this is working. No one 
is helping them, there is no government––and business is booming and everyone is working 
for him or herself, there is no welfare system. So who is interested in government? No one is 
interested. We only need a government to represent the name of Somalia––we don’ t need one 
which interferes in the affairs of the people.”209 In this way, it appears that UNOSOM-II 
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paved the way for the emergence of spoilers by working towards outcomes that were neither 
desired nor perceived favourable by local parties. Retrospectively, it could therefore be 
argued that UNOSOM fostered the conditions for lasting conflict by antagonizing and 
consolidating the clan-based factions, including Aidid’s.210 
 
Regardless, the Secretary-General noted in 1994 that “during the past few weeks, there have 
been some signs that the withdrawal of UNOSOM-II may have triggered among Somali 
leaders an awareness of their responsibilities. […] I am encouraged by the fact that the 
withdrawal of UNOSOM-II has coincided with the signing of agreements that have so far 
helped to avert fighting over the sea and airports in Mogadishu.”211 Again, this would suggest 
that the UN mission effectively came to dominate the security and justice reform process in a 
way that did not include Somali actors. The efforts therefore failed to incentivize ‘bottom-up’ 
state building like in Somaliland.  
Nevertheless, UNOSOM’s massive economic presence did produce lucrative opportunities in 
procurement, construction contracts, property rental, private security and currency exchange. 
This led war merchants and militiamen into more respectable livelihoods
212
 and thereby 
contributed to DDR. After the departure of the mission in 1995, conditions had changed in 
ways that made a livelihood of plunder both more dangerous and less remunerative. Easily 
lootable assets were scarcer; businessmen had secured robust private security forces to protect 
their wealth, and they were able to tap into their clans to deter or punish bandits. Meanwhile, 
traditional elders had also begun to reassert customary clan law, which held criminals and 
their blood payments groups accountable for theft and assaults. While predatory behavior was 
still an option against weak social groups (IDPs, minorities, and low caste lineages) bandits 
were confronted with the fact that many of these groups had armed themselves and therefore 
became more dangerous than in the past.
213
 
Thus, it appears that the mission helped to build longer-term security, albeit unintentionally, 
by initiating a process that had not been part of the mandated activities. For instance, despite 
the inability of international actors to influence Somalia’s security environment 
fundamentally, the Somali police forces have become ‘functionally conventional’: they are 
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structured on lines familiar throughout Africa and express awareness of international practices 
and procedures as they filter them through local interests and dispositions. They are both a 
conventional state institution and a negotiated form of state authority.
214
 According to Hills, 
there are identifiable security organizations such as police, military and intelligence agencies, 
although the boundaries between them are sometimes ambiguous. In the core Somali security 
sector, some of Mogadishu’s police are little more than militiamen in uniform while even the 
UN defines the Somali armed forces as ‘those fighting Al-Shabab, including militias not 
formally integrated into the military.’  
 
On the other hand, these militiamen are often seen as police. According to both the 
Observatory on Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) and Mogadishu’s Police Advisory 
Committee (PAC), Somalis are aware of the distinctions between police and military 
enforcement agencies, but are less concerned with the difference between police and militia. 
Interestingly, although a significant proportion of officers may not see themselves as police, 
this does not stop them from acting or being regarded as such.
215
 This stands in sharp contrast 
with UNOSOM-II that focused on Mogadishu while carrying out its mandated activities. Hills 
notes that international efforts that focus on transforming the SPF into a national force 
capable of supporting the federal government will find that the line ministries that 
theoretically manage it are little more than a minister in an empty office.
216
  
In addition, Adam already argued that “with the departure of UNOSOM-II troops in March 
1995, it has become even more obvious that Somali civil conflicts have to be resolved 
internally by the parties themselves rather than through external intervention.”217  
This process of internal reconciliation seems exactly what has happened in e.g. Somaliland, 
where traditional secular and religious (local) elites, modern elites, representatives of NGOs 
and ordinary citizens have participated in peace and reconciliation conferences in virtually all 
the main towns.
218
 Moreover, this already resembles a holistic SSR approach that may provide 
a more fertile soil for the restoration of the monopoly on violence than the one offered by the 
stabilization efforts of UNOSOM-II. 
 
In this way, some developments in the security system did take place. Menkhaus pointed out 
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that the most dramatic change in governance in Somalia since 1992 has come at the 
neighbourhood or municipal level. These local polities have attracted the most actual day-to-
day governance and reflect local communities’ attempts to provide core functions of 
governance in a context of state collapse. Furthermore, in the immediate post-UNOSOM 
period, this manifested itself mainly in informal, overlapping polities loosely held by clan 
elders and others. Over the course of the second half of the 1990s, however, these local 
polities often became more structured and institutionalised.
219
  
Moreover, while the regions of Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu have different visions of 
Somalia, they have consensus on what the police should look like.
220
 While all three 
governments represent clan-based administrations, Somaliland has the most developed police 
system and coherent governance structures because its government is publicly committed to 
developing a civilian police force aligned to international standards. Similarly, Puntland is 
publicly committed to developing a rule of law and reduced violence, however this did not 
prevent tensions about power sharing between different Majerteen sub-clans to which its less-
developed police can only react. Still, the development of governance and security along 
legitimate lines in Puntland and Somaliland remains highly distinct from Mogadishu’s federal 
government and its Somali Police Force (SPF). The latter now survive primarily because the 
international community supports it and the state it claims to represent.
221
  
 
In theory, the fact that the national reconciliation process was not more successful could not 
have been due to a lack of civil society involvement. There have been two National 
Reconciliation Conferences: first in March 1993, which led to the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
then followed in March 1994 by consultations in Nairobi. According to the Secretary-General, 
there was “significant representation of the civil society of Somalia at each of these major 
conferences. More than 250 representatives of community organizations, elders, scholars, as 
well as women’s groups, participated in the Addis Ababa Conference, while a significant 
number of elders was present at the consultations […].”222  
However, these representatives of civil society had for decades been controlled and 
manipulated by the Siad Barre-regime through all kinds of mass-organizations. This 
manipulation of clan consciousness moreover contributed to the inability of civil society to 
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recover when Siad fell from power and. As a result, the clan political identities in Somali 
society were in a state of constant flux.
223
 In such an immediate post-civil war context, it can 
moreover be hard for an outside force to determine which groups belong to civil society and 
how they perceive their own roles and identities. Ultimately, the decision to monitor relations 
instead of actively empowering societal groups may have been politically more prudent. 
Following Greenhill & Major’s analysis of the ‘prevailing opportunity structure’ to explain 
spoiler behaviour,224 it were the UN’s flawed plans for national reconciliation in Somalia, its 
mismatch between strategy and reality therein and UNOSOM-II’s self-disqualification by 
declaring war on Aidid that contributed to the emergence of peace spoilers in Somalia. 
Undermining the peace process by rejecting UN troops posed a better alternative to armed 
militias than complying with their demands for national reconciliation. Moreover, the fact that 
different regions had different visions of Somalia also helps to explain why the “broad-based 
reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their country”225 UNOSOM-II propagated 
failed to take place.  
Rather than pursuing this goal, different clan-based administrations developed their own 
security forces. These demonstrated governance structures and maintained order in ways that 
were perceived more legitimate by the local populace than the unitary Somali reconstruction 
agenda that was championed by the mission. Moreover, the lack of international military 
involvement in Somaliland and Puntland suggests a voluntary ‘bottom-up’ state building 
process. Thus, it seems that ‘stateness’ in Somalia developed along fragmented lines in the 
post-UNOSOM period, even though ‘the state’ had formally collapsed. These kinds of 
developments also gives us reason to question the feasibility of installing a ‘democratically 
elected government’226 in Somalia. In turn, they demand a ‘reality-check’ of the way in which 
the new Somali state could be shaped.  
                                                          
223 Adam, ‘Somali Civil Wars’, pp. 170-174, 179. 
224 Greenhill & Major, ‘The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords’, 
pp. 8-10. 
225 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of 
Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)’, p. 15. 
226 Resolution 897, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3334th meeting, on 4 February 1994, pp. 2-3. 
60 
 
3.2. Challenges for AMISOM 
 
AMISOM was deployed to Somalia in March 2007, which followed the Ethiopian military 
campaign that had installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu in 
December 2006. The mission was endorsed by the UN and had a mandate to e.g. facilitate 
civil-military operations and conduct military enforcement operations against anti-
government actors, principally Al-Shabab. AMISOM’s small police component was mandated 
to help train, mentor and advise the SPF, although very few of them deployed to Mogadishu 
before 2011 because of the dire security situation on the ground.
227
 In January 2007, the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was mandated to work with all stakeholders in 
supporting the dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia. The mission was to assist in the 
implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) of Somalia, in 
particular, the effective reestablishment and training of all Somali security forces.
228
  
Contrary to UNOSOM-II, this mission was installed in a period when SSR concepts had 
found their way into foreign policy discourse. The new AU strongly promoted the idea of 
‘African solutions to African problems’ which was generally backed by Western powers. 
Furthermore, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had changed the USA’s strategic 
objectives in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. This made the USA the largest individual 
financial contributor to the AU mission.
229
  
 
In short, the thought of peacekeeping had shifted towards multidimensional peacebuilding 
operations. Policy makers recognized the need to include local actors for sustainable reform 
of the security and justice sector. These principles are reflected in the new NSSP for Somalia. 
The United Nations Political Office for Somalia refers to this document as a “Somali-owned 
plan that defines the process by which the Federal Government of Somalia will lead in re-
orienting the policies, structures and operational capacities of security and justice institutions 
and groups in Somalia.” It is “designed to serve as the main conduit for alignment of both 
national and international assistances for the implementation of prioritized, coherent, 
harmonized and sustained interventions in Somalia.”230 AMISOM thus constitutes a 
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multidimensional peacebuilding mission in a complex security environment. The lack of a 
post-conflict peace agreement and the ongoing war with Al-Shabab suggests a 
‘Collapsed/Anarchic’ context that would require strategies to administer security and 
legitimacy. In turn, the mission’s integrated focus on police reform with the ownership 
located at the federal government level suggests a ‘Train/Equip’ strategy for rebuilding 
security. (See: Table 1.1/1.2) This proactive attitude is also reflected in AMISOM’s Civil 
Affairs Unit’s objectives to conduct “activities towards confidence-building, conflict 
management, support to reconciliation and engaging in supporting the restoration and 
extension of state authority.”231 
  
While AMISOM’s recognition of its own roles and responsibilities in legitimacy building 
marks a clear difference with UNOSOM-II, the mission nonetheless encountered fierce armed 
resistance from Al-Shabab militias. For instance, in April 2008, the Peace and Security 
Council of the AU strongly condemned “the attacks against AMISOM positions […] the 
killing of Government Officials, as well as all other acts of violence perpetrated by those 
elements seeking to undermine the political process, hinder the operations of AMISOM and 
undermine regional peace and stability.”232 Similarly, in May 2009 the Council strongly 
condemned “the aggression perpetrated against the TFG of Somalia and the civilian 
population in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by armed groups, including foreign 
elements, bent on undermining the peace and reconciliation process, as well as regional 
stability.”233  
To understand Al-Shabab’s armed resistance to the mission, it must be stressed that the 
movement has since 2008 transformed itself from a “predominantly nationalist organization 
with the localized agenda of driving Ethiopians from Somalia to a ‘hybrid movement’ that has 
increasingly embraced the Al-Qaeda-led global jihad against the West.”234 This means that the 
militias principally developed out of a general resentment of the Ethiopian military campaign 
that had installed the TFG. According to Williams – an associate professor who extensively 
studied the African Union Mission in Somalia – the AU mission was widely regarded as a 
provider of cover for the imminent withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Mogadishu: “Having 
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installed the TFG in Mogadishu, the continued presence of Ethiopian troops stirred up a 
considerable local backlash and violence intensified dramatically throughout 2007 […]. 
Ethiopian authorities were thus well aware that the presence of their troops in Mogadishu was 
undermining the legitimacy of the TFG they had installed but they were unwilling to 
withdraw without an alternative force to fill the subsequent security vacuum. AMISOM was 
conceived as the solution to that problem […].”235  
This again suggests that the new AU mission suffered a considerable decline of legitimacy by 
cooperating with the Ethiopian-established Somali TFG. In November 2009, the Puntland-
based Horseed Media published an article that appears to confirm this problem. This medium 
was established by a “dynamic and intellectual group of Somali Diaspora in Netherlands and 
Finland.” Its purpose is “to advocate for peace and development in Somalia while informing 
the public on current affairs in a balanced and non-stereotyped manner.”236 The November 
2009 article stated that: 
 
“The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has become overanxious to hear existing and viable other 
authorities when the TFG is faltering and falling apart. Furthermore, some TFG members have the assumption 
that the existing of a functioning separate State within Somalia is perilous to their AMISOM guarded authority. 
They privately argued that any other authorities within Somalia, in the eyes of the international community, will 
degrade the legitimacy of Somali Government.  
[…] The gap of priorities and political growth of Puntland and that of the Transitional Federal Government is 
too wide and too hard to reconcile. Puntland is a relatively progressive and stable semi-autonomous State, 
where the Transitional Federal Government is a physically, socially, politically and economically blockaded 
entity. Moreover, Puntland’s priority is to develop its territory’s social and economic infrastructures. On the 
contrary, the Mogadishu based TFG is focused on their daily survival and regrettable social development issues 
is an alien concept to them.”
237
 
 
It is noteworthy that the publication of this article followed the second iteration of the TFG in 
early 2009. In turn, this configuration of the TFG was still criticized by many Somalis that it 
was too close to Ethiopia, too heavily influenced by diaspora elites and one particular clan, 
the Hawiye. In addition, it was widely perceived as corrupt, ineffective and largely 
uninterested in pursuing a strategy of conflict resolution and political reconciliation across 
Somalia.
238
 Furthermore, a subsequent article clearly illustrates the incredibility of the TFG 
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and the indispensability of AMISOM as its protection force: 
 
““Without us the transitional government would collapse immediately,” said one [AMISOM] colonel, whose 
men in forward positions regularly come under gunshot and mortar fire. The airport and seaport remain open, 
at least. The headquarters complex was largely spared the effects of the daily clashes between pro-[TFG] 
government militia and Islamist fighters, due to what one officer involved in military-civilian operations 
described as their friendly ties with local villagers. That was until a double suicide attack in September killed 17 
peacekeepers, including their second in command, who was a Burundian general.”
239
 
 
 
In this way, the combination of the TFG’s weakness and local hostility towards Ethiopian 
troops provided ample fodder for Al-Shabab to intensify its attacks on the AU force.240  
The issues related to fragmented ‘stateness’ in Somalia were already encountered by 
UNOSOM-II. Here, they also began to pose challenges to AMISOM’s state building 
capability. According to its mandate, the mission’s troops were to assist in the effective 
reestablishment and training of all Somali security forces in accordance with the Federal-
Government owned NSSP.241 However, Human Rights Watch reported in May 2010 that 
“many Somalis already view the TFG, […] as merely another armed faction.  
For example, Abdi – a teenager who staggered into the Dadaab refugee camps – did not know 
whether the mortar attacks that killed his family and his three friends were the work of Al-
Shabab or the TFG, but he feared both equally. “For a time you will see Al-Shabab in control 
and then you will see the government in control,” he said of his neighbourhood in Mogadishu. 
“The only thing that doesn’t change is the suffering of the people.””242 In the light of these 
first-hand accounts, it seems justified to argue that because the TFG in Mogadishu lacks local 
stability and credibility, it is also unable to maintain professional and accountable security 
forces. In turn, AMISOM’s support to the Somali government degrades the mission’s own 
legitimacy in the eyes of competing Somali factions, to whom the TFG merely represents 
another contender for power.  
This, again, is due to the historical legacy of the Siad Barre era: it created a specific arena of 
segmentary political conflict and predatory violence which has marked Somali society 
throughout the late 1990s and into the 2000s. Such rivalry was even visible within the TFG, 
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which certainly helps to explain why even after lengthy negotiations and a complex power-
sharing agreement, it has become virtually defunct.243 Specifically, by early 2005, serious 
splits occurred within the TFG after which the so-called ‘Mogadishu Group’ – a coalition of 
clans, militia leaders, civic groups and Islamists – also became divided and fighting erupted in 
early 2006. This pattern repeated itself until late 2007 when open splits occurred in both the 
opposition and the TFG.244 These splits reflect the rivalry and divisions within the Somali 
state, as well as the inability of the TFG to pose a legitimate government institution. 
Moreover, state failure in the Somali context still followed the Weberian definition of an 
entity that commands a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a territory.245 In this 
way, the former splits constituted a major problem for the state building project: how could a 
government that experiences such a lack of domestic legitimacy possibly claim the monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force?  
In turn, AMISOM’s activities towards confidence-building, conflict management and support 
to reconciliation
246
 so far proved insufficient to provide stability within the government, let 
alone resolve its underlying problems. By contrast, the mission began to support a regime that 
had been imposed by a foreign military intervention and clearly lacked sufficient legitimacy. 
This demonstrates the profound disregard of the mission for the challenges of Somali state 
building. In turn, these challenges seem not to have been on the agenda of the liberal 
international community, which made AMISOM’s approach rather technical and focused on 
capacity building in ways similar to UNOSOM-II.  
 
Importantly, the focus on capacity building in Somalia has not been entirely unjustified. From 
a liberal-institutionalist perspective, there were considerable problems with the capacity of 
state institutions that required attention. However, as the Somali security sector effectively 
became politicized via ‘clan-katura’ during the Barre-regime, these institutions themselves 
were essentially linked to processes of state disintegration. By 2012, the Somali security 
forces were still in a dire state: the narrow ‘security sector’ suffered from unreliable salaries 
because not all Somali soldiers received their monthly 100 US$ stipends. In addition to an 
ineffective logistical and medical support capacity, the forces also lacked modern weaponry – 
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many Somali National Army weapons actually belonged to warlords, clans and individuals.247  
Indeed, the TFG still lacked an effective fighting force beyond a core group of militia that 
served as the president’s private army. Moreover, TFG troops and police quickly became 
associated with illegal roadblocks and looting. AMISOM even accused them of selling 
operational information about its activities to Al-Shabab. Furthermore, the most severe and 
urgent problems that undermined the security sector were those of unresolved clan loyalties 
between e.g. clan leaders and warlords.248 Thus, the lack of a credible central government with 
a functioning security system, as well as the failure to establish one due to unresolved crises 
of citizenship and legitimacy means that there was no ‘state’ to render ‘capable’ in the liberal-
democratic sense.249 In this way, attempts to increase the capacity of institutions therefore 
seemed out of touch with the reality of security and governance in Somalia. 
Crucially, the international community’s insistence to keep on treating Somalia as a ‘post-
conflict’ setting was increasingly out of touch with the grim realities on the ground. This 
involved political pressure from key donor states on aid agencies to downplay the 
humanitarian crisis, stay silent on TFG human rights abuses, and maintain aid programmes in 
order to help maintain the legitimacy of the TFG.250 In such a context, it is virtually 
impossible for any international military force to restore the monopoly on violence in favour 
of any party without becoming part of the conflict itself.  
 
Given this preliminary conclusion, what could still serve as prospects for future state building 
in Somalia? The latest report of the chairperson of the AU commission on the situation in 
Somalia, issued in October 2014, has outlined the technical and capacity building 
performances of AMISOM. In terms of security building, these include e.g. a “community-
based policing course for 160 police officers […] in proactive policing, in partnership with the 
concerned communities.” This came together with a “community awareness and response 
program […] to sensitize members of the public on the need to partner and work with the 
police.”251 In terms of legitimacy building, AMISOM’s Civil Affairs Unit has “engaged 
community elders at different levels in order […] to mobilize the communities in support of 
the military operations.” Furthermore, the Civil Affairs Unit has been working “to sensitize 
                                                          
247 Adam, ‘Somali Civil Wars’, p. 233. 
248 Author’s interviews with AMISOM officials, Nairobi, August 2012 and Mogadishu, January 2013, in: 
Williams, ‘Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM’s Seven Strategic Challenges’, pp. 232-233. 
249 Jackson, ‘Security Sector Reform and State Building’, p. 1817. 
250 Adam, ‘Somali Civil Wars’, p. 231. 
251 ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia’, PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), © African 
Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 October 2014) pp. 1-12, there: pp. 6-7. 
66 
 
members of Somali Civil Society on Government policies […]” which in turn “agreed to 
create a Somalia Civil Society Consortium that will work with the FGS.”252  
This seems hopeful for the prospect of state building, albeit at the community level. However, 
the fact that the NSSP remains a federal government-owned project could make it difficult to 
substantiate these developments. In the light of the federal government’s ongoing legitimacy 
problems, it may therefore be necessary to rethink the liberal-democratic emphasis on the 
national state that underpins AMISOM’s international military efforts. In particular, the 
assertion that a liberal-democratic government that successfully claims the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force is incompatible with the Somali context is not without historical 
precedent. Research shows that before the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, president Siad 
Barre commanded the means to the use of force more than other actors. By contrast, the 
means to coercion in stateless societies are privately provided, and while these private 
organizations that challenge state authority can become quite powerful, historical records 
show that no internal group in Somalia commanded the most substantial forms of military 
machinery.253  
Thus, the history of Somalia shows that apart from the dictator Siad Barre – who was backed 
by the Great Powers in the context of the Cold War rivalry – not a single legitimate authority 
in Somalia has been able to claim the monopoly on violence. Given the recent stress on 
developing ‘capable’ states along liberal-democratic lines, it is furthermore improbable that 
the international community will again support another Barre figure. On the other hand, while 
the Federal Government’s claim of sovereignty enjoys some international credibility, local 
power structures based on political clans exercise de facto authority in most regions of 
Somalia. Meanwhile, the mission’s preference towards Mogadishu is detrimental to the 
purpose of peace and reconciliation because Mogadishu’s exclusivist politics, exacerbated by 
government corruption, alienates certain regions of the country and contributes to 
instability.254  
It therefore would seem that AMISOM’s activities require a ‘reality-check’ of the path to 
dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia and the type of administration and security sector this 
is supposed to engender. For instance the ‘quasi-states’ of Somaliland and Puntland – where 
no international military force has intervened – exercise some meaningful control over their 
respective territories, while south-central Somalia completely lacks any Weberian ‘monopoly 
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on the legitimate use of force’ and various other actors are the real power-holders.255 This 
again suggests the need to rethink the liberal-democratic model that so far has underpinned 
the armed state building efforts in Somalia. In this regard, many would concur with the leader 
of a (Somali) women’s organisation: “I don’t believe the country can be united in the near 
future. It should be built up from the bottom from the smallest possible neighborhoods or 
villages.” There are even calls for what is in effect a return to traditional xeer law: “Each clan 
should sort itself out and neighboring clans should have arrangements for compensation.”256 
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4. Clashing Identities in Sudan 
 
“British colonialism did nothing to foster a sense of a national Sudanese identity –  
in effect, the opposite occurred…The policies of the colonial government undermined  
any possibility of constructing Sudanese national unity after independence. The Sudan  
that emerged as an independent state in 1956 was a loose confederation of tribal, racial  
and regional identities.”257 
 
 
4.1. AMIS in Darfur: ‘African Solutions to African Problems’?  
 
Given Darfur’s history of 
inter-tribal, resource-based 
clashes, it is not surprising 
that British politics initially 
interpreted the new 
developments in 2003 through 
established historical frames. 
Descriptions of the violence in 
fact began with ‘unconfirmed 
reports of tribal conflict’ in 
January.
258
  
Subsequently, the conflict in 
Darfur has generally presented 
as a fight of two blocks, 
respectively between the rebel 
259
 movements Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) against the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) in Khartoum, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the 
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Janjaweed militia. The latter covers a variety of tribal militias that operated in Darfur, each 
with its own resources and autonomy of command.
260
 Of the two rebel movements, the JEM 
is the smallest and does not claim to be fighting for independence, but only to obtain 
participation in government. It is more multi-ethnic than the SLA and open to all who 
advocated an African Islam. The SLA on the other hand consists mainly of Furs, Masalits and 
Zaghawas; groups which have been fighting Arabs for a longer time. It is regarded as the 
armed part of the SLM, which was formed in response to the “unfair political, economic and 
social practises of the Sudanese government towards black Africans of Darfur.” In this way, 
the SLA entered into the struggle alongside the JEM for the equal rights of Darfur and its 
inhabitants against the government, which favoured the Arab component of the Sudanese 
peoples.
261
 However, the rivalry between the two SLA leaders, Abdel Wahid al-Nur (Fur, 
with a following among diverse ethnic groups) and Minni Minawi (Zaghawa) became intense 
and bitter. Similarly, the differences between these two and the leader of JEM – Khalil 
Ibrahim – were also significant. According to De Waal, these divergences prevented the 
Darfur resistance from forming a united political front.
262
 
With respect to the Sudanese armed forces, the pre-eminent scholar of Sudanese history M.W. 
Daly notes that “from the mid-1980s, both the regional government and national armed forces 
stationed in Darfur became, in effect if not always by intent, parties to ethnic conflict. 
Officials recruited ethnic Fur to the security forces, where they played a dual role of secret 
insurgents everywhere: police by day, thugs by night. Arab officers and soldiers followed 
suit.”263 This process reached a new level of intensity when the neighboring Chad’s 
interethnic warfare merged with Darfur’s in the late 1980s.264 It is beyond the scope of this 
inquiry to elaborate on the results of Chadian influences on the conflicts in Sudan. However, 
it remains noteworthy that the Janjaweed originated from armed groups that formed during 
the civil wars in Chad between 1962 and 1991.
265
 Furthermore, the Janjaweed
266
 militia used 
                                                          
260 M. Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (Pantheon Books, New York, 
2009) p. 256. 
261 V. Danielová, ‘Darfur Crisis of 2003: Analysis of the Darfur Conflict from the Times of First Clashes to the 
Present Day’, Ethnologia Actualis Vol. 14 No. 1 (2014) pp. 45-46. 
262 A. de Waal, ‘Darfur and the Failure of  the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 83 No. 6 (2007) p. 1040. 
263 M.W. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) p. 244. 
264 Ibid., p. 245. 
265 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, p. 256. 
266 People in Sudan usually translate the word ‘Janjaweed’ as ‘Aspirit’ or ‘Devil riding a horse’. See: S.M. 
Hassan & C.E. Ray, Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009). ; J. Levy (2009): Genocide in Darfur (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc. 
2009). 
70 
 
rape and other forms of sexual violence as a weapon of terror and humiliation. Additionally 
the militias used strategic landscape burning in order to destroy everything that could be 
useful for inhabitants of Darfur. As a result, the people who survived the massacre did not 
have a place where to return and became IDPs.
267 
 
Crucially, the Darfur conflict had also been part of a broader, national struggle between 
northern and southern Sudan. According to Ali & Matthews, most of the southern elite 
gravitated towards regional political parties, contested elections and became entangled in 
Khartoum’s power struggles. Due to their narrow base of support and meagre resources, these 
parties were too weak to influence Khartoum’s policies towards the south or other national 
issues. When it emerged in 1983, the SPLM/SPLA sought to change the status-quo by 
challenging this political impasse. To this end, the movement linked political marginalization, 
economic underdevelopment and cultural domination by the north of Sudan to national 
processes. It refused to operate from within these prevailing structures that favoured the 
dominant bloc and expressed its commitment to end the monopoly of power in Khartoum. 
The SPLM/SPLA ruled out the option of working within the existing system because it 
facilitated the abuse and manipulation of liberal democracy by the dominant bloc in 
Khartoum. Consequently, the movement called for a “radical restructuring of the power of the 
central government that will end once and for all the monopolisation of power by any self-
appointed gang of thieves and criminals, whatever their backgrounds, whether they come in 
the form of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers.”268  
 
At first, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed to “monitor and observe 
compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the GoS and the SLM/SLA 
of 8 April, 2004.” AMIS troops were to protect civilians under imminent threat and within 
close proximity, while the responsibility to protect civilians remained with the GoS.  
On 5 May 2006, the focus of the mission shifted to support and implement the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) between the former parties. In this context, AMIS continued to monitor 
and verify “the cessation of hostilities by all parties, hostile militia activities against the 
population and attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias.”269  
Unlike AMISOM that predominantly focused on training and equipping activities, AMIS in 
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Sudan followed the observe and monitor strategy to provide immediate security (see: Table 
1.1). Unfortunately, there are no available primary accounts of the AU ‘Peace and Security 
Council’ on AMIS’ activities. Nevertheless, the mission’s progress is amply covered by civil 
NGOs, human rights organizations and not least by the scholarly literature. Luqman for 
instance points out that while the initial deployment of AMIS peacekeepers led to a reduction 
in violent attacks against the civilian population, the mission was unable to maintain this 
momentum.
270
  
This is also reflected in the findings of Refugees International – which advocates for the 
protection of displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.
271
 In 2005, the 
organization already noted that “the international presence in the form of AMIS and the 
humanitarian agencies has helped to deter attacks on civilians in the IDP camps and major 
urban centres.” However, the period from “August through October of 2005 saw a re-
escalation of the conflict, with AMIS becoming a prominent target of violence itself.”272 
Notwithstanding, the international community accorded a high degree of legitimacy to AMIS, 
and the mission obtained the official consent of the GoS and the other belligerent parties. In 
addition, it was hailed as a first concrete example of ‘African solutions to African problems’ 
in practice. This, however, placed a major burden of the responsibility to protect upon the 
continent least able to marshal the necessary troops, funds and material to conduct a large-
scale civilian-protection operation.
273
 
 
A part of this problem has certainly been the mission’s lack of experience. Refugees 
International argues that AMIS initially was deployed to Darfur with minimal planning and 
preparation: “Because this was the very first AU mission of this size and scope, the AMIS 
officers have had little experience with drafting plans on such a scale.”274 Next, there also 
were substantial problems with the force capacity. Given the assumption that 2-10 troops are 
required for every 1.000 inhabitants within the crisis zone, Darfur’s population of 
approximately 6 million people means that AMIS should have had 12.000-60.000 personnel. 
Furthermore, given that the GoS army had a logistical capacity for 60.000 soldiers and the 
Janjaweed militias were an estimated 10.000-20.000 strong, AMIS should have comprised a 
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minimum of 10.000 and potentially 45.000 troops. However, on neither of these measures the 
number of 3.320 AMIS’ personnel, including 2.341 military personnel, sufficed to offer 
genuine protection to a majority of Darfur’s civilians.275 This deficiency largely rendered the 
mission incapable to carry out its mandate, with devastating consequences for local civilians. 
According to Murithi, the AU monitoring operation was “floundering and enabling 
government forces, the Janjaweed, and the armed resistance groups to continue fighting 
amongst themselves and to continue the carnage and destruction of the lives and property of 
Darfurians.”276  
In turn, it appears that the mission’s problems have informed a public perception that AMIS is 
incapable of enforcing its mandate effectively. This stems from the fact that AMIS troops 
came under constant harassment, with casualties inflicted by parties to the Darfur conflict.
277
 
Illustratively, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission in Sudan placed the responsibility for the “deteriorating security situation in the 
AMIS Force Sector 2 Area of responsibility in South Darfur” in June 2005 squarely on the 
SLA and the JEM.
278
 Shortly thereafter, two Nigerian AMIS peacekeepers were killed in 
action by “men dressed in SLA uniform that […] escaped in typical SLA vehicles into which 
they loaded their own casualty.”279 
 
Of course, it would be overly simplistic and unjust to blame the enduring insecurity of Darfur 
entirely on AMIS’ lack of performance. In areas where the mission established its presence, 
both the security and humanitarian situations improved. The Joint Implementation Mechanism 
for instance concluded in June 2005 that AMIS’s presence ‘provided a very positive 
influence’ since it helped to diminish ‘the number of clashes between the belligerent parties 
and the number of attacks on civilians.’280 This was confirmed by a UN official who added 
that “more people would have died if AMIS had not been there. We’re getting a huge result 
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from a very few troops. Most people say that they are better than UN peacekeepers.”281 
Notwithstanding, to gain insight into the problems that were encountered by this stabilization 
mission, we need to reflect on the legitimacy of the peace process that underpinned it.  
First of all, the integrity of the peace process that led to the signing of the DPA had been 
compromised from the beginning. In most circumstances, the political and diplomatic 
objective is to obtain a peace agreement. The deployed peacekeeping force then comes 
secondary to that agreement and supports it. In Darfur, however, it was the other way around. 
The primary international objective had been to dispatch a UN force and the DPA 
negotiations became a prop for achieving that.  
In turn, the prospect of being ‘saved’ by UN troops raised the hopes of Darfurians and made 
them consider any political compromises or offer of AMIS peacekeepers as an unacceptable 
second best. Despite being praised as the first real example of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’, AMIS’ troops “in effect were told that they were the second-best option and would 
not be staying long, let alone reinforced and resupplied.”282 Among other factors, this seems 
to have considerably undermined the legitimacy of the peace process. Luqman, for instance, 
concludes that “given the inability to buy the non-signatory groups into the agreement, the 
continued fragmentation of the rebels front, increasing violence, the allegation that the AU is 
bias[ed] [against] the non-signatory groups by these groups and Darfurian in refugee and 
displaced persons camps and the lack of commitment to implement the text of the DPA by the 
government of Sudan seriously undermined the peace agreement.”283  
Specifically, suspicion arose among civilians and parties to the conflict that AMIS was biased 
towards the GoS and the SLM/Minnawi faction. To a certain extent, this had been the 
mission’s own fault because it failed to take sufficient community confidence-building 
measures. According to Refugees International, AMIS officers tended to concentrate their 
discussions and relationship-building with those in power – the sheikhs of the villages and 
camps – as opposed to reaching out to the broader community. Displaced persons, in turn, 
said they could not tell the difference between an AU soldier and any other soldier in uniform. 
However one woman said “I know who the AU soldiers are because they are the soldiers that 
don’t shoot at us”, this was followed by assertions that GoS troops were operating in white 
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vehicles that mimicked those of AMIS.
284
 In this way, it seems likely that the mission came 
too closely associated with the pro-Arab parties to the Darfur conflict. 
 
Second, the issue of disarmament offers deeper insight into the problems with state building. 
The official position of the AU was that the GoS should fulfil its obligation under UNSC 
Resolution 1556 and disarm the Janjaweed. According to De Waal, however, there was no 
prospect of reaching any agreement on a definition of these militia. The GoS insisted that the 
Janjaweed consisted solely of ‘outlaw militia’ i.e. bandit groups. In this way, no group or 
individual would ever admit to being associated with the Janjaweed. Conversely, many 
among the armed movements – especially the Minni Minawi – insisted that the Janjaweed 
consisted out of all groups that had obtained weapons with the support or consent of the 
government.
285
  
The disagreement over the Janjaweed is indicative of a contrast between the ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ peace i.e. conflicting security interests between the parties. This is because the 
Janjaweed militia, which committed the most atrocious war crimes, had been backed by the 
GoS. Specifically, it was amply stated in news articles from prominent media e.g. The New 
York Times and The Washington Post that the government was not only “supporting their 
activities”, but also “recruited Janjaweed members, supplied resources to the militia and 
provided air support to Janjaweed land attacks.”286 In turn, the GoS tried to distance itself 
from the activities of these militia and did not want to be held responsible for their actions. 
Already in 1990, however, this government was organizing militias in Darfur.
287
 Whereas the 
GoS could still justify the participation of the Sudanese armed forces in clashes on the pretext 
of suppressing rebels who first attacked official military bases, the government support to 
Janjaweed militias remained a contentious and strongly criticized issue.
288
 This created a 
particular legacy for UNAMID that will be discussed in the third part of this chapter. 
 
Third, there also were significant problems with SSR at both national and local levels. In 
particular, the DPA security arrangements included provisions for the demilitarization of 
                                                          
284
 Chin & Morgenstein, No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan, p. 19.  
285 De Waal, ‘Darfur and the Failure of  the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 1050. 
286 N. Theerasatiankul, Patterns in Reporting African Conflicts: The Case of Darfur (Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC. 
2008) p. 74. 
287 M. Mamdani, ‘How can we name the Darfur crisis: Preliminary Thoughts on Darfur’, in: F.M. Manji & P. 
Burnett (ed.), African Voices on Development and Social Justice: Editorials from Pambazuka News 2004 (Cape 
Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010) pp. 256-262, there: p. 259. 
288 Danielová, ‘Darfur Crisis of 2003’, p. 50. 
75 
 
displaced persons’ camps and their perimeters. Inside these camps, a ‘community police 
force’ was to be established, to be trained by AMIS civilian police. Thereby, it was 
envisioned that this community police would be a volunteer force drawn from the community 
itself that would ultimately become part of the regular police.
289
 However, the state of the 
‘regular police’ remained abysmal during AMIS’ deployment. According to Williams, the 
“responsibility for the direct physical security for the IDP camps lay primarily with the 
Sudanese police, not AMIS – a police force widely distrusted by the IDPs because many of 
them turned out to be ‘re-packaged’ Janjaweed or GoS soldiers.”290 This is echoed by 
Refugees International, which states that there is a “huge gulf of mistrust” between the 
Sudanese police and the local population as women have reported being harassed and raped 
by GoS police officers.
291
 As long as these problems with the national police remain 
unresolved, the establishment of a local community police force will at best lead to security in 
a vacuum.  
These problems with the security sector are indicative of the ‘criminalization of the state’ that 
preceded the government’s marginalization of Darfur. This is because the Sudanese state 
became a participant to the conflict and directed violence against a particular group of 
inhabitants, the Darfurians. The fact that these phenomena are also connected with the 
Sudanese police, armed forces and the Janjaweed militia
292
 represents serious obstacles for 
institutional reform within the context of liberal-democratic state building. It effectively 
means that Sudan at this point constituted a barbaric state that treated its own people as 
enemies and systematically murdered large numbers of them as a matter of policy.
293
 Given 
the vast challenges inherent to this type of environment and AMIS’ problems, the mission’s 
efforts at providing immediate security therefore at best had a superficial effect on the 
prospects for post-conflict state building.  
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4.2. UNMIS: Contributing to Post-conflict State building? 
 
According to Mamdani, the 
debate on socioeconomic 
change in independent Sudan 
was framed by a contest 
between tradition and 
modernity. ‘Tradition’ was 
defended by chiefs in the 
native authority system and by 
religious leaders: forces that 
organized around the identity 
of tribe and religion and 
provided urban politicians with 
a rural base. ‘Modernity’ was 
typically defended by urban-
based social classes and groups, particularly those who belonged to the ranks of the 
intelligentsia, the army and the merchant class. However, despite the decades-long contention 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of power, both shared certain assumptions. They 
identified historical change with ‘modernity’ and believed that ‘tradition’ was inimical to 
change. Furthermore, both believed that the colonial system had conserved tradition. 
Postcolonial politics thus chose the modern over the traditional, which locked both sides into 
a cul-de-sac: because only a minority of the population participated in the modern sector, 
modernists had no way to think of change except as an imposition from above. At the same 
time, traditionalists tended to regard all change as a treat to tradition. It is this assumption that 
explains “why “modernists” in Sudan were inevitably anti-democratic, why they assumed that 
the vast majority of people –– those living in the traditional sector –– would oppose 
modernity and change.”294 Moreover, while ‘modernity’ prevailed after independence, it did 
not proliferate Western notions of citizenship. Instead, post-independence rulers chose to 
build on the colonial legacy of indirect rule: a system of governance that combines a highly 
centralized system with decentralized local administration. This resulted in politicized racial 
and ethnic identities in both North and South Sudan. In the latter case, this led to a 
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fragmentation of society along ethnic lines, the result being that South Sudan now consists of 
societies of individual nations.
295
 The ‘modernizing’ minority in turn had no choice but to 
look for a vehicle to mobilize the majority. This vehicle was the nation, which raised another 
question: If the end of colonialism meant the independence of the nation, then who constituted 
‘the nation’? In this way, the battle between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ became joined over 
the nation. This led to state-sponsored ‘Arabization’, which not only reinforced a self-
conscious Arab power at the centre but also broadened the resistance that began in the south 
to other marginal areas in northern Sudan.
296
 In this way, the Sudanese post-colonial history 
can be perceived as a struggle to define the nation and citizenship. Moreover, the present 
practice of ‘indigenization’ – in which citizenship is an exclusive right reserved for indigenes, 
natives, sons and daughters of the soil – increasingly leads to violence. Excluded groups start 
seeking their own homeland and, where this proves futile, the outcome is often institutional 
discrimination and/or violence.
297
 
 
On 24 March 2005, the UNSC decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS). The mission was to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) between the GoS and the SPLM/SPLA. This agreement also stipulated 
that, after a transitory period of six years of cohabitation by the Government of National 
Unity and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), a referendum on self-determination for 
the South would be held. This eventually determined Sudan’s division into two countries in 
January 2011, with 98 percent of the population voting in favour of separation.
298
 In order to 
support the CPA’s implementation, the mission was mandated to e.g. “assist the parties to the 
CPA in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of 
human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with 
the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability; to assist the 
parties to the CPA […] in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with 
democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise 
assist in the training of police; to assist the parties to the CPA in promoting understanding of 
the peace process and the role of UNMIS (my Italics) by means of an effective public 
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information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society; to assist in the establishment of the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as called for in the CPA […] and its 
implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction.”299 
 
UNMIS’ mandate reflects a clear holistic understanding of Security System Reform. It 
emphasizes the need to establish democratic security forces and promote the rule of law. 
Additionally, it was also promising that the mission acknowledged its own role in the peace 
process and proactively tried to explain it to local communities through a public information 
campaign. In June 2006, UNMIS Radio started broadcasting and aired news bulletins in 
English, Arabic and Juba Arabic which were updated three times per day. The GoSS 
approved the roll-out of this station, where after UNMIS planned for complete coverage of the 
largest population centres in southern Sudan. 
By the end of UNMIS’ mandate, successful demobilization operations had taken place in 
Wau, Kadugli and Khartoum. “As a result, a total of 7.030 ex-combatants, including 1.666 
women and 420 disabled participants were demobilized. As of 29 March 2011, the national 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme had demobilized a total of 44.263 
ex-combatants: 32.298 in the North and 11.965 in the South.” Furthermore, at the “end of 
February, 27.280 ex-combatants had been provided with information on reintegration 
opportunities in Northern and Southern Sudan. Of that number, 17.354 registered for 
reintegration support with the UNDP implementing partners: 12.081 completed the training 
component of the programme and 8.700 received reintegration packages.” However, “despite 
significant progress and efforts, the gap between demobilization and reintegration caused 
concern […] posing a potential threat to security and stability in Southern Sudan and the 
border areas.”300  
In South Sudan, civilian disarmament efforts went hand in hand with unnecessary violence 
and brutality perpetrated by the soldiers in charge. In September 2008, the Lakes State 
Legislative Assembly condemned the “disarmament atrocities” after a series of events in 
Rumbek that resulted in at least seven people severely or fatally injured and thousands of 
Sudanese pounds looted from local businessmen. In a civilian disarmament round from June 
to December 2008, the battalion carrying out the operations allegedly seized vehicles at gun-
point, beat, looted and raped women in Yirol, Pacong and Akot. In addition, Akolde Jinub – a 
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resident of Rumbek – blamed the GoSS for the atrocities as it was President Salva Kiir who 
on May 22, 2008 decreed a ‘shoot-to-kill’ order with respect to the disarmament process.  
In response to these events, the Assembly stated that “the honourable members were not 
disobeying the Government of South Sudan presidential decree that ordered disarmament to 
be carried out in all Southern Sudan”, but that they as lawmakers were seeking to resolve 
“problems intensifying against Rumbek civilians.”301  
Furthermore, in April 2010 the Secretary-General reported that serious challenges remained 
with respect to the justice system throughout Sudan: “The judiciary in general has limited 
independence and transparency […] in Southern Sudan, a key challenge is the lack of 
legislative, judicial and law-enforcement institutions.”302 In terms of judicial reform, it 
however was already hopeful that the Assembly publicly condemned these excesses by 
security forces. Similarly, its public expression of the intention to resolve the insecurity of 
civilians displayed an attitude conducive to the implementation of the rule of law. 
 
     Figure 4.1. Community Expectations from Disarmament 
Reflecting on the aftermath of the 
disarmament efforts in South 
Sudan may lead to important 
insights. From March 2012 to July 
2013, the South Sudan Action 
Network on Small Arms 
(SSANSA) monitored a 
disarmament scheme in the Jonglei 
State. Figure 4.1 shows the 
community expectations regarding 
the disarmament campaign within 
this territory. Roughly one out of 
three people (29%) expected 
disarmament to translate into peace 
and/or security. Interestingly, the 
same number of questioned people 
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expected disarmament to bring basic services (11%), socio-economic development (10%) and 
business and trade (8%).
303
 This means that for these people, peace and security are connected 
to or even equated with human development. Furthermore, in 2006 the government indicated 
that insecurity related to the abuse of small arms and light weapons was the biggest factor 
undermining government attempts to provide services, attract investments and development. 
However, after the disarmament round in 2006, communities still did not experience any of 
the promised socio-economic development,  
investment or services. Whereas it would be infeasible to realise all of these promises 
overnight in a post-conflict environment, one can nevertheless “hardly conclude that states 
having lower levels of arms misuse have higher levels of development. While such promises 
might be intended to induce voluntary arms surrender, it can also create unrealistic 
expectations, misunderstandings, frustrations and further conflicts impacting negatively on 
future engagement with state authorities.”304 
 
The latter is crucial: according to figure 
4.2, the vast majority (61%) of all 
respondents in the Jonglei State suggested 
that the government should take full 
responsibility to protect communities by 
strengthening the state’s security sector. 
Here it can be recognized how disarmament 
efforts were followed by a need for SSR, 
given that the “collection of civilian held 
arms might mean more work for the 
security services, because the youth who 
might have been providing protection to 
community members had been disabled by 
removing their arms. This meant that, the 
full responsibility including failure to 
provide protection to civilians shifted to the 
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state.”305 In both the North and the South, however, there were significant problems with the 
establishment of state security services. Under the CPA, the Sudanese armed forces and the 
SPLA would remain independent bodies with separate military command structures and ‘both 
forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan’s National Armed Forces.’ They were 
complemented by Joint Integrated Units that consisted of approximately 40.000 troops which 
were equally composed of elements from both the SAF and SPLA and positioned throughout 
Southern Sudan, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei.
306
  
These units were formed as an experimental mechanism to fill post-war security vacuums in 
areas where the reach of the state was limited. In addition, they were to serve as a means of 
building confidence between the former warring parties, given the prospect of a potential 
integrated army. However, with the secession of South Sudan in 2011 the Joint Integrated 
Units were dissolved and only some of their members were likely to join the new security 
apparatus. Furthermore, policing had been solely addressed by the GoS in the pre-CPA 
period, which created a need to develop a completely new police structure for Southern 
Sudan. However, the creation of a modern civilian policing service did not seem to be a 
priority of the GoSS. Moreover, as many former SPLA soldiers were absorbed into the new 
Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), with little to no training in human rights, this 
institution had little to no personnel who were trained in policing civilian populations.
307
  
In December 2010, the Secretary-General reported that “to date, UNMIS police have trained 
25.840 Southern Sudan Police Service […] in referendum security duties.” This, however, 
stands in sharp contrast to the mere 1.448 officers that were trained in “the protection of 
civilians and an appropriate response to disruptions in law and order.”308  
 
This reflects a discrepancy between the peace and security needs of the state vis-à-vis those of 
its people. In turn, UNMIS also experienced major problems in cooperating with the 
governments of (South) Sudan. First, the authorities in Khartoum continued to oppose 
UNMIS Radio broadcastings in the North, which contradicted the obligation under the status-
of-forces agreement to allow the station to broadcast countrywide.
309
 Furthermore, the Sudan 
Radio and Television Commission stated that UNMIS will not be able to broadcast 
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independently in Darfur or areas of east Sudan but may be allowed some airtime on 
Government transmitters. Crucially, such a limitation in the light of the “overall mandate of 
UNMIS and the larger problem to be addressed in Darfur after the reaching of a peace 
agreement severely restricted the Mission’s broadcasting capability.”310 Importantly, Van der 
Lijn argues that the strength and capacity of the leading National Congress Party (NCP) in 
Khartoum had been large, compared to that of the governments of countries where 
peacekeeping operations are usually deployed. This meant that UNMIS had less leverage to 
carry out its mandate and required the ‘goodwill’ of the GoS in Khartoum, which was often 
missing. Within the ranks of the NCP, there were moreover ‘hardliners’ who viewed the CPA 
as “a trap that might cause the loss of power for the NCP.” On the other hand, the ‘reformers’ 
viewed the CPA as the only way to maintain the unity of the country and integrate the SPLM 
into the elite. Crucially, the disposition of the NCP towards UNMIS became less favourable 
and cooperative as the hardliners were gaining momentum: “At the beginning of 2006, the 
NCP supported protests and campaigns against the United Nations […] restricted the freedom 
of movement from UN personnel and Sudanese UNMIS staff were arrested.”311 “As a result, 
for example, the rule of law unit of UNMIS faced large obstacles in implementing its policies 
as Khartoum is uninterested in cooperation.”312  
On the other hand, it is a myth that Khartoum is in control of all government structures 
throughout the country. While there is a solid security apparatus, the other parts of the 
government are either not aware of what the rest is doing or even thwart each other. It is no 
secret that the GoS in Khartoum suffers from hampering issues of legitimacy. For example, in 
May 2009 a political alliance of 17 parties accused the NCP of seeking to control power and 
wealth; they expressed their scepticism about the ruling party’s commitment to ensure fair and 
free elections. In response, a government spokesperson said that there is no legal basis for the 
claim that the government is illegitimate and those who stand behind it are “fooling people in 
the name of law and constitution.” Next, he called for the said parties to resort to the 
constitutional court for a ruling on the issue.
313
   
 
Because the North was generally less open to assistance, UNMIS directed most of its attention 
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for capacity and institution-building to Southern Sudan. However, the GoSS and SPLM were 
often criticized as being unrepresentative of all the ethnic groups residing there. According to 
Laudati – who carried out three months of fieldwork in three states of South Sudan between 
January and April 2008 – the failure of the “less than Comprehensive Peace Agreement” to 
consider the marginalization of different groups means that the material deprivations and 
structural inequalities faced by many ethnic groups in South Sudan will continue even as the 
SPLA transitions from a military organization into a governance institution. In terms of 
representativeness, it is noteworthy that the CPA negotiations had been limited to the NCP for 
the North and the SPLM/A for the South. While it remained an accomplishment that all armed 
factions of the North and South committed themselves or at least tended to respect the CPA, 
the northern opposition’s support for the CPA was however based on the premise that it 
would lead to democracy. According to them, by contrast, it only appears to have provided 
legitimacy to the NCP and the SPLM, which caused their support to wane.
314
  
For instance, with regard to the northern Blue Nile State, the Secretary-General noted in 
April, 2011 that “while there has been some progress towards the implementation of the 
provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on popular consultations, significant 
work remains […] 69.429 people expressed their opinions on the implementation of the 
agreement [during a series of public hearings]. Messages conveyed during the hearings 
focused on forms of governance and development needs in the State. The next stage involves 
the conduct of thematic  hearings in March with the participation of political parties, civil 
society, members of State and National Assemblies, native administration and intellectuals. 
This process has been delayed owing to various political and procedural disagreements.”315 
This means that the mission was already in the process of implementing the CPA before the 
members of civil society  were even consulted, let alone included in the provisions. In this 
way, the CPA became a treaty which predominantly served the interests of the SPLM and the 
NCP, at the detriment of excluded ethnic groups. 
  
Furthermore, next to its status as a political movement and security institution, the problems 
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with the DDR programme also indicate the SPLM/A’s role as an income provider. According 
to the CPA, the SPLA was supposed to start demobilizing 90.000 out of its approximately 
230.000 combatants in January 2006. In practice, however, the process only began in June 
2009. By May 2011, merely 12.252 ex-combatants had been demobilised. This delay is 
mainly due to the difficulty to convince combatants to demobilise voluntarily. On the one 
hand, the SPLA commanders had been reluctant to downsize their troops as they perceived 
their political strength as deriving directly from the number of men under their command. On 
the other hand, many combatants themselves preferred to stay in the SPLA since they viewed 
it as a secure source of income, especially after the SPLA started paying salaries in 2005.
316
 
Moreover, the SPLM/A managed to effectively mobilize political discourses of ‘victims’ vs. 
‘liberators’ to legitimize the violent means by which they appropriate tenure and resources. 
The SPLA largely viewed civilians as a resource for plunder […] through the expropriation of 
taxes, food and labour.
317
  
Meanwhile, in October 2008, UNMIS reported increased engagement on human rights issues 
by civil society organizations and government representatives in Southern Sudan. 
Nevertheless, the report also stated that “institutions involved in safeguarding the rule of law 
need to be strengthened. Access to justice remained a challenge.”318 For instance, while 
UNMIS’ Rule of Law Division in Southern Sudan has been quite effectively co-located in the 
GoSS ministries, its Human Rights Division has been much more directed at Darfur at the 
expense of the rest of the country. In addition, the traditional tribal structures, including tribal 
courts, were barely supported despite their substantial capacity to resolve conflicts.
319
 Thus, 
UNMIS helped to consolidate the SPLM’s political primacy in South Sudan, despite the 
movement’s limited ethnic support base there. Moreover, the mission’s bias towards formal 
state institutions led it to ignore the availability of pre-existing, indigenous methods of 
conflict resolution. 
 
With respect to the Jonglei State, figure 4.3. displays how the five communities surveyed 
perceive their security since the beginning of the disarmament campaign in March 2012. It 
must be emphasized that this survey instrument did not assess the extent to which Jonglei has 
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become peaceful in relation   Figure 4.3. Perceived Security Effects of Disarmament   
to the disarmament 
campaign. Regardless, it 
is striking how only 
3,33% of the respondents 
– all from Bor county – 
stated that  security had 
improved significantly. 
This, however, is 
unsurprising, given that 
the state capital has been 
relatively secure even 
during the worst inter-communal clashes. On the other hand, 60% of the  respondents in 
Ayod, 72,58% in Akobo, 66,66% in Bor and 55% in Duk stated that security improved but 
only a little. Meanwhile, 40% of the respondents in Ayod, 27,42% in Akobo, 30% in Bor, 
40% in Duk and 6,78% in Twic East felt that security remained the same. Crucially, however, 
“stayed the same or only improved a little” could mean that there remain considerable levels 
of insecurity, given the high levels of violence prior to the disarmament campaign. In this 
way, security remaining the same does not necessarily mean that the government is doing well 
with regard to providing protection to the populace. Furthermore, 93,22% of respondents in 
Twic East indicated that they felt less secure since the disarmament campaign begun. 
According to SSANSA, the “striking fact here is that, Twic East is also the county that 
accounted for the highest level of voluntary surrender and the lowest level of community 
resistance. This is problematic because the community members accepted to lay down arms 
expecting state protection.” In this way, the data collected in Jonglei State suggest that DDR 
will ultimately fail if the government, police and armed forces do not provide the population 
with security in return.
320
 
 
Similarly, Kwaja identifies the key issues in Sudan as “the provision of security for the people 
on the one hand and the control of institutions providing security on the other, so that they 
provide security to the citizens and not the regime in power.” Conversely, he also notes that 
reforming the security sector “should also be geared towards repositioning the armed forces to 
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protect the national security and territorial integrity of the Sudanese state.”321 In the context of 
Sudan, however, the need to have security institutions that provide security to the people and 
not to the regime in power, while simultaneously requiring the Sudanese armed forces to 
protect the state, appear to be mutually incompatible. This is because Sudan suffers from 
crises of citizenship and legitimacy that manifest themselves in the perceived dichotomy 
between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in the state. This has split the Sudanese society between 
urban-based elites and rural natives, as expressed by the continued marginalization of many 
ethnic groups while the GoS in Khartoum and the GoSS in Juba served only a narrow elite. 
Crucially, the CPA had never provided for these marginalized groups in the first place. 
UNMIS, in turn, tried to support the implementation of the agreement through capacity and 
institution-building. Its local partners – embodied by government authorities in the North and 
South –however were highly problematic. On the one hand, the mission sought to address the 
ongoing Darfur crisis, whereby it antagonized the northern Khartoum administration. On the 
other hand, the GoSS also suffered from insufficient legitimacy that sometimes alienated 
UNMIS from local ethnic communities. This is because the SPLM/A too represented only a 
narrow ethnic faction, despite its key roles as a political institution, security organization and 
income provider which the mission helped to consolidate. 
 
In both the North and South, the state’s security services are interwoven with these 
fundamental problems within the state. In this way, the joint UNMIS-GoSS draft justice and 
security interim review to “strengthen local ownership of the development process in these 
sectors, increase the understanding of formal and informal security and conflict resolution 
mechanisms and assisting the Government of South Sudan in setting priorities for the 
transformation and revitalization of the justice and security sector”322 could at best have 
resulted in short- to middle-term capacity improvements. Nevertheless, there has indeed been 
a real tension between the two partners, which is evident from e.g. the words of the SPLA 
commander Bahr el Gazal: “UN people visit us to tell us that we are not civilised because we 
do not understand human rights… We had our own rules long before they came!”323  
In addition, Baker & Scheye pointed out the unsustainability of the then current justice sector 
development design. They drew upon more than 200 interviews which they undertook in 2007 
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in three towns (Juba, Yei and Malakal) and their surroundings in southern Sudan.  One of the 
interviewees concerned a police officer with years of experience in southern Sudan, who 
stated the infeasibility of establishing a police service that would “cover south Sudan … [It] 
would be impossible. You couldn’t do it.” In his opinion, which was echoed by UNMIS 
officials, the best that “can be achieved, after 30 years, is a state police service working 
primarily in the former ‘garrison towns’, leaving most of ‘the population of southern Sudan 
with no contact with the [state] police.’”324  
In this sense, there has been some progress because “UNMIS police also conducted 3.255 
patrols in the Mission area, including 638 joint confidence-building and long-range patrols 
with local police.”325 However, many former SPLA soldiers were absorbed into the new 
SPSS.
326
 This contributed mostly to consolidating the SPLA in the security sector, while the 
SPLM in the GoSS continued to marginalize many of South Sudan’s ethnic groups. For this 
reason, the contribution of the former UNMIS’ effort to liberal state building becomes 
questionable at the very least. Ultimately, although negative peace in the ‘North-South’ 
conflict had grosso modo been achieved, UNMIS’ contribution to durable peace through 
institution-building thus seems rather superficial. 
      
                                                          
324 B. Baker & E. Scheye, ‘Access to Justice in a Post-Conflict State: Donor-supported Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan’, International Peacekeeping Vol. 16 No. 2 (2009) pp. 172, 176. 
325 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’, pp. 1-24, there: p. 12. 
326 Deng Deng, ’Linking DDR, Security Sector Development and Transitional Justice in Southern Sudan’,  
p. 170. 
88 
 
4.3. UNAMID: A Preliminary Assessment 
 
The scope of the ongoing crisis in Darfur relative to AMIS’ capacity and mandate led to calls 
for the deployment of a more substantial UN peace operation with a robust civilian protection 
mandate. In 2007, the international community heeded these calls by authorizing the African 
Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This was an “unprecedented 
joint peace operation constituted by forces of ‘predominantly African character, while being 
largely and externally financed and structured by UN command and control and 
backstopping.”327 UNAMID was given a mandate to e.g. “support, in coordination with the 
parties, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the establishment and training of 
community police in camps for internally displaced persons, to support capacity-building of 
the Government of Sudan police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of 
human rights and accountability, and to support the institutional development of the police of 
the movements.” In this respect, the mission was to “support the efforts of the Government of 
the Sudan and of the police of the movements (my Italics) to maintain public order and build 
the capacity of Sudanese law enforcement […].” In terms of judicial reform, the mission was 
mandated to e.g. “assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, 
and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity.”328 
 
The predominant image that arises from previous military deployments in Sudan is that they 
were mainly able to provide for short- or middle-term adjustments in the security and justice 
sectors. UNAMID, in this sense, demonstrates a clear progression vis-à-vis earlier 
deployments because it recognized the status of non-state political movements as ‘non-
statutory security forces’ (see: Figure 2.1.). With respect to the DPA, the mission’s leadership 
also seems to have learned its lessons as it, for example, stated that “a negotiated political 
settlement that includes all armed groups, including the non-signatory armed movements, 
remains a key element of a comprehensive solution to the conflict.”329 More than its 
predecessors, UNAMID reflects an understanding of the problematic context in which it 
operated. The mission’s troops were required to provide immediate security, demobilize and 
reintegrate combatants and downsize security actors, of which the latter two were 
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characteristic of post-conflict SSR.
330
 However, as the ‘post-conflict’ context of Sudan kept 
changing, UNAMID became increasingly impeded in carrying out its mandate. According to 
Luqman, the DPA ended any semblance of unity within or between the SLM/A and the JEM 
when major factions refused to sign the agreement. They cited the lack of ownership by 
parties to the peace process as its most critical shortcoming. Thereafter, the rebel movements 
in Darfur splintered into several factions which effectively reinforced the mistrust among 
parties to the conflict. This, in turn, resulted in constant breaches of the ceasefire agreement 
and increasing attacks between parties and against civilians.
331
 Crucially, the controversy and 
fractionalization that surrounded the signing of the new Doha peace agreement in 2011 has 
had adverse consequences for UNAMID’s authority. This is evident from the events on e.g. 
24 March, 2013, when “an armed convoy of UN soldiers escorting a group of displaced 
people to a peace conference surrendered the group to armed abductors without resisting.” 
The abductors belonged to the hard-line SLA faction that refused to participate in the Doha 
peace process and now opposed the conference.
332
 
 
Hostilities perpetrated by the SLA against international troops in Darfur were not a new 
feature. In late 2005, two Nigerian AMIS peacekeepers were already killed by “men dressed 
in SLA uniform that […] escaped in typical SLA vehicles […].”333 The reason for this local 
hostility is also similar. Whereas AMIS came too closely associated with the GoS and the 
SLM/Minnawi faction, UNAMID too had to rely on the “willingness of the Government of 
Sudan at both the national and the local levels to undertake significant reform of its security 
and judicial institutions.”334 Meanwhile, the government’s military operations in Darfur 
continued throughout 2009, reflecting a “lack of readiness on the part of the movements and 
the Government” to engage in the Doha peace process. In response, the Secretary-General 
called out to “all parties to the conflict to use this opportunity to re-engage with the peace 
process in good faith, with a view to achieving a sustainable peace for all Darfurians.”335 
While the head of UNAMID indicated in April 2009 that the mission still spoke “with 
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increasing authority on the ground”, he also cautiously stated that “[…] civilians continue to 
face unacceptable risks and no solution has been found to remedy the great wrongs and 
injustices that have been committed. (my Italics)”336 Ultimately, finding such a solution 
entails not just the rebuilding of state institutions, but also processes of peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation. Here, we arrive at an understanding of Call & Cousens definition of 
state building as “actions undertaken […] which may or may not contribute to 
peacebuilding”337 Given UNAMID’s focus on state institutions and its capacity-building 
efforts to rebuild them, the mission does not appear to possess the appropriate set of tools to 
offer support processes to the former processes. Arguably, it is UNAMID’s continued reliance 
on the GoS together with the mission’s inability to change the status-quo for civilians that 
made it into a target for hostilities. 
Prior to the elections of April 2010, the Secretary-General urged “all stakeholders to take 
concrete steps at the political level to guarantee a credible electoral process […] to ensure that 
all groups in Darfur, especially internally displaced persons, are able to participate in an 
atmosphere of free expression and with full freedom of  movement.”338 Conversely, the 
elections were not available to all voters and some could not vote because of lasting violence 
in the region. The result was that the NCP won the elections and its leader, president Omar al-
Bashir (who ultimately was accused of involvement in the Darfur genocide by the 
International Criminal Court) remained in office.
339
 Crucially, if the potential “problems and 
dangers”340 of organizing elections in post-conflict states cannot be resolved only by 
establishing effective judicial and security institutions, then this would justify a ‘reality-
check’ of viewing democratically held elections as the preferred outcome and final exit-point 
for an international military intervention.  
 
In October 2010, the Secretary-General reported that the leaders of SLA and JEM continued 
to refrain from participating in the peace talks. The GoS also had yet to demonstrate a 
willingness to make sufficiently attractive concessions to these parties. For the AU-UN led 
international community, it was however important that all parties would enter into the 
negotiations: “Only a comprehensive and inclusive negotiated political settlement can bring 
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about a credible cessation of hostilities and address the root causes of conflict in Darfur.”341  
In this sense, there was widespread agreement on the root causes of the conflict and key issues 
affecting the Doha peace process among civil society actors, who represented various 
constituencies across Darfur. They had been brought together by UNAMID, which organized 
and held a series of preparatory workshops and forums to sensitize and mobilize civil society 
representatives for the peace process.
342
 While this increased focus on civil society 
empowerment does correspond with Miller’s recommended ‘Administer’ strategy for 
legitimacy building (see: Table 1.2.), both security and legitimacy are ultimately contingent 
upon the ability of the GoS and the armed movements to reconcile their differences. These 
groups, however, continued to clash along the lines ‘Arab’ vs. ‘African’ and, more deeply, 
according to the dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ identities. Indeed, some would 
argue that the situation still could not be called ‘post-conflict’.343 When observing the period 
from 2007 to 2011, it can be concluded that UNAMID effectively managed to put plasters on 
a wound that desperately needs a long-term, complementary and more multifaceted treatment. 
Despite the lessons which UNAMID had learned vis-à-vis previous military deployments, it 
was still beyond the mission’s scope to provide such a treatment. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This inquiry has tried to assess the extent to which post-Cold War Security Sector/System 
Reform (SSR) has contributed to post-conflict state building in Somalia and Sudan. To this 
end, it has focused on the liberal-democratic approach of institution-building which, despite a 
vast number of criticisms, has remained the prevalent paradigm of state reconstruction. As a 
theoretical framework, this inquiry has adopted the concept of ‘armed state building’. This is 
based on a century of US/UN-led efforts to use political, military and economic power to 
compel states to govern more effectively.  
It is important to reiterate that the analysis has focused exclusively on international military 
efforts as an artificially isolated exercise of power by liberal states. For this reason, the 
inquiry has not methodologically embedded the influence of political and economic power on 
the interactions with Somalia and Sudan during periods of military deployment. This calls for 
further research in this direction, which could include e.g. the roles of international 
negotiation and diplomacy, as well as ODA by donor states. Regardless, this inquiry has 
conducted four case studies of past international military efforts in Somalia and Sudan. 
Thereby, it has also offered preliminary analyses of two missions that are currently still 
deployed. These insights allow us to test the hypothesis that armed state building should 
involve more invasive efforts in greater degrees of failure, and less invasive efforts in lesser 
degrees. 
 
Furthermore, this inquiry has critically appraised the notion that ‘institutionalization before 
liberalization’ is most suitable to realise peace and security in post-conflict environments.  
To this end, it has attempted to measure the qualitative and quantitative contribution of SSR 
in the restoration/establishment of the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Part of this has 
been an assessment of the progress made within Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) programs. In turn, the inquiry has examined the legitimacy of the state 
institutions that were under construction. To this end, it has tried to measure input or process 
legitimacy by looking at the establishment of state institutions. In turn, it has scrutinized 
attempts to build legitimacy by empowering civil society representatives and implementing 
community confidence-building measures.  
In addition, this inquiry has looked at efforts to (re)establish the rule of law to pinpoint the 
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problematic relationship between state and society. To this end, it has unravelled the historical 
problems with liberal-democratic state building in these countries. In this way, we have found 
that a myriad of predominantly structural factors and processes – the urban/rural divide and 
the ethnicization of politics together with contested issues of territoriality and identity – have 
jointly culminated in the ‘crises of citizenship and legitimacy in the state’. In particular, the 
different relations between the central government and a variety of groups have over time 
resulted in unequal statuses of citizenship. This process has divided the political loyalties of 
these groups of people and fuelled the relative deprivation between them.  
This myriad of factors and processes underpins the communal conflicts that often lead to state 
disintegration. In this way, the crises of citizenship and legitimacy are chameleonic 
phenomena that manifest themselves differently in varying contexts. Nonetheless, they all 
stem from structural factors that have historically determined the relationship between the 
state and society. These structural factors also help to explain the problems with ‘spoilers’ in 
peace processes. In addition, anarchic circumstances often add immediate security concerns to 
these factors. This combination of factors and concerns could render the development of 
mobilized political groups even more intractable. Together, these crises and spoiler problems 
have been used to interpret the state building challenges of Somalia and Sudan. 
 
With respect to the restoration/establishment of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, 
comparing the efforts in Somalia and Sudan have led to a number of observations. First of all, 
the contributions were all quantitative or numerical i.e. focused on increasing the capacity of 
the state’s security and justice institutions. Qualitative contributions would, for instance, have 
aimed at gradually improving the authority and sustainability of these institutions within their 
local contexts. In turn, the missions can all be said to have followed the post-Cold War, 
liberal-democratic approach of building institutional capacities. There are, however, two 
comments to be made on this point.  
First, the practice of this approach became subject to change as the rocky 1990s culminated 
into the twenty-first century. For example, the deployment of UNOSOM-II still expressed the 
features of an exit-strategy, which is illustrated by the fact that “international support for the 
programme, including the payment of salaries for the Somali police, ceased on 31 March 
1995 with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate.”344 This mission, moreover, lacked a 
strategy for the transition from a failed state to a democratically elected government: “in 
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Somalia there was no clear vision of how reconciliation should proceed. […] The expectation 
was that the combatants, after years of fighting a civil war, could somehow resolve their 
differences in a few months.”345 By contrast, UNAMID’s leadership emphasized the 
importance of including non-signatory armed movements in order to arrive at a 
comprehensive solution to the conflict.
346
 Although the task of building capacities and 
institutions in post-conflict environments was never abandoned, a decade past of 
accumulating experience in the practice of these activities has taught the international 
community to include non-statutory security forces, non-state political movements and non-
signatory armed movements into their state reconstruction efforts.  
 
Next, the liberal-democratic state remains the normative framework in which these efforts 
take place. In South Sudan, samples of local field survey-data moreover suggest that people, 
even in the most war-torn environments, still require the government, police and armed forces 
to protect them after disarmament rounds. For this reason, the ongoing focus on capacity and 
institution-building is not misguided. Nevertheless, within Miller’s typology of state failure, 
these efforts correspond to the inability of ‘incapable’ states to deliver public goods and 
services. In Somalia and Sudan, however, the state has experienced a complex intertwinement 
of ‘anarchic’, illegitimate and barbaric failures.347 These failures have been fuelled by 
structural, historical factors which contributed to the crises of citizenship and legitimacy. 
Ultimately, the outcome of these processes confronted the international military deployments 
with fundamentally different challenges than merely fixing a state that lacks the technical 
capability to govern.  
In this way, the restoration of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has been infeasible 
as an a-contextual and strictly technical exercise. In Somalia, the international community 
propagated the re-establishment of the “political and administrative structures, based on a 
broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of the country.”348 Not only did 
UNOSOM-II fail to provide a platform for such reconciliation, but the Secretary-General’s 
rhetoric also reflects a profound lack of contextual understanding of the Somali state. 
Specifically, the only political and administrative structures that could have been re-
established were those of the Siad Barre-regime. In the history of Somalia, only this dictator 
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had been able to claim a monopoly on violence. For this purpose, Siad used the method of 
‘clan-katura’ to dominate civil and security organizations, while interchangeably being 
backed by the contending powers of the Cold War era. This dictatorial system effectively 
collapsed in the early 1990s and, for obvious reasons, could not have been reinvented by the 
liberal international community. Instead, the latter tried to establish a democratically elected 
government without first resolving the root causes that led to state collapse. Under AMISOM, 
the negative impact of this attitude became even more severe as the mission began to support 
a Somali government that had been imposed by Ethiopia.  
The international military efforts thus helped to establish a ruling authority without regard for 
the Somali context. This is illustrated by the fact that thee TFG was criticized by many 
Somalis and widely perceived as corrupt, ineffective and largely uninterested in pursuing a 
strategy of conflict resolution and political reconciliation across Somalia.
349
 In this way, the 
TFG is therefore likely to have contributed to Somalis’ distrust of central government, rather 
than re-establishing a legitimate national government authority. Thus, while remodelling 
Somalia according to Barre’s dictatorial style evidently was not an option, UNOSOM-II and 
AMISOM instead propagated an a-historic and a-contextual type of government that was 
perceived as an illegitimate external imposition. This did not leave the Somalis with many 
options and it therefore is hardly surprising that the voluntary disarmament ended in a failure.  
 
Moreover, the lack of a legitimate, functioning government implies that the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force could not have been restored. While the institution and capacity-
building efforts that targeted the Somali security sector might have been useful, the lack of a 
legitimate and functioning state meant that these efforts were performed within a vacuum.  
For ‘best practices’, the international community could alternatively have looked at parts of 
the country were marginalized under the Siad Barre-regime. While the south of Somalia 
remained in a state of collapse, the northern Somaliland and Puntland developed into self-
governing enclaves.
350
  
In particular, the fact that these areas had largely fallen outside Mogadishu’s framework 
resulted in the primacy of informal networks and more indigenous modes of governance. 
Northern Somali elites for instance had to rely on local elders to protect their dealings in the 
smuggling trade against presidential interference. Given that these elites could not rely on 
formal courts or the president’s militias for their protection, the elders had to use e.g. local 
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customary social arrangements to manage their affairs.
351
 By contrast, the TFG did not even 
have the semblance of national unity. Occurring splits furthermore disproved the idea that the 
TFG was a unitary whole that itself was not prone to the crises of citizenship and legitimacy. 
Even with the international support, the TFG thus constituted merely another party to the 
conflict.  
This tendency can also be observed in Sudan, where the GoS became a participant to the 
conflict and directed violence against the Darfurians. Here we have a clear example of a 
barbaric state, which also problematizes attempts to restore the monopoly on the use of force. 
Next to train/equip efforts, this would also have required activities towards justice and 
reconciliation. In turn, such efforts could have contributed to restoring the rule of law, given 
that they help to influence the broad parameters of the citizens’ relationship to the state and 
vice versa. On the contrary, Miller’s strategies for building security and legitimacy make no 
explicit reference to these concepts or their treatment. Considering the experiences from 
Sudan, it may however be deemed critical to consider these politically contentious issues. 
AMIS, UNMIS and UNAMID all had to rely on the willingness of the GoS at the national and 
local levels. In turn, the GoS’ military operations in Darfur continued throughout 2009, which 
worked against the efforts of the missions.  
Thus, in spite of the international military presence, it is therefore unlikely that significant 
changes occurred in the situation of the Darfurians. Next, it appears plausible that this could 
have induced spoiler behaviour, such as the SLA’s recurring hostilities against the 
international troops that worked with the GoS. In theory, this lack of change may very well 
have contributed to the perpetuation of Darfurian conflict narratives that would justify the 
SLA’s actions. Processes of justice and reconciliation could help to transform these narratives 
by resolving the relationship between state and society. Looking at figure 2.2., repairing this 
relationship could then help to benefit the security sector and the rule of law. In this way, the 
institutional development of the state goes hand in hand with transforming the relationship 
between the government, ex-combatants and their constituents.  
Conversely, the disposition of the NCP towards UNMIS gradually became less favourable 
and cooperative as the CPA became viewed as “a trap that might cause the loss of power for 
the NCP.”  This was unsurprising, given that the Sudanese modernists were inevitably anti-
democratic. Moreover, their spheres of influence stretched out to the Sudanese government, 
police, armed forces and Janjaweed militia. In this way, the restoration of the monopoly on 
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the legitimate use of force in Sudan would still require a profound restructuring of the 
relations between the state and society. The hostilities perpetrated against AMIS and 
UNAMID suggest that these missions themselves had already become part of the conflict, 
whereas UNMIS’ efforts towards Joint Integrated Units were cancelled in 2011. Crucially, 
while these missions’ efforts may have increased the capacities of the police and armed 
forces, they have not resolved the legitimacy problems that underpinned both the GoS and 
GoSS. This aspect, however, remains indispensable to the restoration of the state’s monopoly 
on the use of force. 
 
Comparing the missions leads to a number of distinguishable differences, similarities and 
trends. First, they all suffered from declining legitimacy due to the weak political foundations 
of their post-conflict state building efforts. In Somalia, UNOSOM-II first lacked a pathway 
for the political reconstruction of the state, after which AMISOM supported a process that 
was owned by an illegitimate federal government. In Sudan, both the DPA and CPA lacked 
comprehensiveness and the representation of all parties’ interests – both signatory and non-
signatory – as well as the signatory parties’ commitment to implementation. In turn, the 
missions’ cooperation with government authorities has commonly been problematic. 
Effectively, it has repeatedly hampered the local legitimacy of the international armed forces. 
The violence perpetrated against AMIS and UNAMID, for instance, can be seen in this light. 
Nevertheless, AMIS’ lack of capacity has also contributed to its declining credibility as a 
peacekeeping force. Ultimately, it can be concluded that the ‘post-conflict’ nature of these 
environments merely referred to the absence of direct violence between parties. In these 
fragile circumstances, the combination of weak political foundations and the missions’ firm 
reliance on government parties at the expense of ownership at other levels has helped to spark 
renewed violence. 
Second, a growing trend has seen the missions increasingly recognizing their own roles and 
responsibilities in the process of legitimacy building. This is reflected in the missions’ 
mandates and in the emerging civilian-military units for confidence-building. Similarly, the 
missions have expressed their growing attention for the empowerment of civil society 
representatives and the incorporation of non-statutory security forces into SSR efforts. In this 
sense, the military focus on civil society itself has however remained a fairly technical 
exercise. In Somalia and Sudan, it has mostly been aimed at including the representatives 
rather than empowering them. UNMIS, for example, already began to support the CPA’s 
implementation before civil society members had been consulted.  
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One the one hand, this attitude is related to the top-down, state-centred nature of SSR in 
which civil society involvement has become supplementary rather than integral. One the other 
hand, the missions’ treatment of civil society also seemed to presuppose that these 
representatives comprised a consistently unitary and independent socio-political group which 
has been resistant to the crises of citizenship and legitimacy. In Somalia, however, it already 
became clear in the 1990s that the Siad Barre-dictatorship had manipulated civil organizations 
to the extent that they had become part of the state collapse as well. 
Finally, the missions’ focus on the institutional development of the state through capacity-
building has in all cases neglected the value of indigenous providers of security and justice. 
This can be observed in Southern Sudan, where UNMIS barely supported the traditional tribal 
structures despite their substantial capacity to resolve conflicts.
352
 In addition, the liberal 
international community has also ignored the meaning or significance or parallel 
developments, such as in Somaliland and Puntland, where no international military force was 
deployed. Conversely, the bottom-up voluntary demobilization here was more successful than 
the top-down military efforts to achieve the same in the Mogadishu area. The result of the 
missions’ focus, in turn, has often been the support or consolidation of state institutions that 
either did not fit into the context, provoked resistance or were established prematurely. While 
the paradigm of liberal state building remains intact, there are thus contextual factors that also 
determine whether or not institution-building will contribute to peacebuilding. 
‘Institutionalization before liberalization’ therefore does not serve as a panacea for peace and 
security in fragile environments. For this reason, both the practice of institution-building and 
its preferred exit-point of democratically held elections require a reality-check in each case. 
 
In sum, international military attempts to rebuild the state’s security and justice sectors alone 
cannot deliver long-term contributions to post-conflict state building. While such attempts 
however remain essential, in Somalia and Sudan they mostly contributed short- to middle-
term improvements. These conversely led to e.g. security in a vacuum and have nowhere been 
praised for their sustainability. This, in turn, corresponds to the frequently cited criticisms of 
the liberal-institutionalist approach as being static, technical, a-historic with little or no regard 
for local contexts. Moreover, it has been indicated that resolving the crises of citizenship and 
legitimacy would also require long-term peacebuilding. This could mean e.g. protracted 
efforts to change the contours of the relations between parties to the conflict. In theory, this 
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could help to establish a set of norms to which all parties could adhere, in order to transform 
spoiler behaviour through socialization. It is noteworthy that none of the missions adopted the 
‘socialization’ strategy of spoiler management.353 The general picture that emerges from the 
sources is that such activities remained confined to the Secretary-General’s exercise of 
political pressure. In this regard, the only real exception has been AMISOM’s military action 
against Al-Shabab, which to a significant extent can be explained by the fact that the 
movement was branded a terrorist organization. Further research is needed to complete this 
image, but for now the evidence suggests that additional effort is required to rebuild the state 
in a manner that deals with all parties.  
Nevertheless, it remains an illusion to think that peacekeeping alone can replace the political 
and diplomatic processes needed to reach agreements and reconciliation in the longer term: 
“the best soldiers in the world can only lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace 
itself.”354 Crucially, these international military forces are bound to manoeuver in a highly 
complex and dangerous force-field. In fragile environments, they face the complicated task of 
retaining their credibility as a neutral powerbroker. On the other hand, both Miller’s typology 
and hypothesis of armed state building can be described as static, technical and unresponsive 
to contextual circumstances. For this reason, it becomes problematic to use them to label and 
prescribe behaviour towards the constantly changing realities of failed and fragile states. Nor 
do they provide solace for efforts that reach beyond institution and capacity-building and 
move into the relations between different groups of people. 
 
For this reason, this inquiry concludes by suggesting that this kind of peacebuilding efforts do 
not belong to the military domain. Donor and development organizations might be more 
suitable for these tasks, while the military continues to focus on institutional development. 
The prospects for such a cooperation would provide a fertile soil for additional follow-up 
studies. Similarly, further research is needed to place Somalia and Sudan in their regional and 
geopolitical contexts. Looking at the historical interactions between e.g. Ethiopia and Somalia 
and Chad and Sudan may help us to arrive at a broader understanding of the predominantly 
structural factors that underpin the challenges of state building here. As the twenty-first 
century unfolds, the Horn of Africa continues to lag behind. The cross-border spill-overs of 
these chronic problems in turn demand a focus on the regional totality of their root causes.  
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